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Abstract 
This thesis evaluates how regulation on capital requirements is associated with cost and 
profit efficiency of banks. It allows an international comparison on banking regulation, 
capturing changes on public policies towards banks over time further, it encompasses 
one of the major financial crises since 1929. The impact of regulatory capital 
requirements on banking efficiency is assessed using the stochastic frontier production 
function for panel data to estimate inefficiency effects. It is used a panel dataset of 865 
observations from 156 publicly listed commercial banks operating in 30 countries and 
covering a nine year time-horizon (2004-2012). Besides the impact on capital 
regulation, we also controlled for the influence of other regulatory variables, 
macroeconomic conditions, market structure characteristics and the state of financial 
development. Our results suggest that capital requirements negatively affect 
inefficiency, meaning that, for our sample, an increase on regulatory equity ratios will 
lead to an efficiency improvement. Regarding other regulatory control variables, we 
would say that regulation should aim to increase market discipline, while restricting 
banks activities. The power of supervisory agencies seems to negatively impact banks’ 
efficiency, but in in stressful conditions, it may help banks being more cost efficient. 
JEL classification: G21, G28, D24, C23, C24 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
The banking sector has an on-going track record of instability and systemic crisis which 
impacts either locally – e.g. Sweden 1990’s banking crisis – or globally – e.g. United 
States sub-prime financial disaster in 2007-2008. But financial crisis are not a product 
of the last decades. In a brief history of the financial crises, The Economist (2014a) lists 
relevant ones, being the first reference to an episode in 1792 in the United States of 
America. As financial crisis occur, one after another, leaving legacies of bankruptcy, 
unemployment and poverty, institutions and regulatory standards have been designed to 
increase the system resilience and minimize its natural tendency to instability. Such 
measures encompass, among others, the establishment of deposit insurance schemes, the 
definition of minimum capital requirements, and the design of regulatory and 
supervision authorities. Nevertheless, financial development made the financial system 
more interconnected (Rajan, 2005). Hence, as the 2007-2008 financial turmoil has 
shown, the regulatory framework in place has not proved to be efficient in preventing 
the causes of this major shock. All over the world, many financial institutions have been 
bailed out by national governments, at taxpayers’ expense, in what was understood as 
the major financial crisis after the world’s biggest in 1929 (The Economist, 2014a). Just 
after the implementation of a set of rules known as Basel II, the debate on how to 
improve regulation to minimize the risk of a new episode in the near term was again 
open. 
The debate arises because either among the industry or the academia, it is understood 
that regulation on the banking sector affects banks’ performance. Due to the important 
role of banks in providing financial services to the rest of the economy, the impact of 
regulation has been a matter of study, namely at the international level. Barth, Caprio 
and Levine (2004) conducted a study on the relationship between banking supervisory 
and regulatory practices and banking sector development and fragility. This study is 
particularly relevant because it used a database on bank regulation in 107 different 
countries. The authors did not find a close link between capital regulation and bank 
performance. More recently, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) have studied the relationship 
between capital supervision and banks’ performance during the month following 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Capital or equity plays an important role on banks 
because it acts as a loss-absorber, preventing financial distress and potential insolvency 
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(Admati et al., 2010). Among many dimensions of the regulatory framework which are 
applied to the banking sector, regulation on capital requirements is probably the most 
discussed. A new regulatory framework – known as Basel III – aims to raise the quality, 
consistency and transparency of capital base. Among the industry, any new regulation 
that forces banks to raise more capital is generally unwelcome. Usually the debate on 
capital requirements imposed on banks is based on their impact on profitability, with 
hypothetical trade-offs between banks safety and banks being an attractive investment 
(The Economist, 2013a). However, from a public policy perspective, regulation on 
capital requirements should be evaluated on its impact on banking efficiency and not on 
a profitability framework only. Therefore, this dissertation aims to address the impact of 
capital regulation on banks’ efficiency in a context of financial distress. Such context is 
not negligible because it is usually in adverse scenarios that it is realized that the 
regulatory framework in place is not enough in helping to stabilize an inherently 
unstable system.  
Prior studies have addressed bank efficiency. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) studied 
the impact of environmental conditions on banks’ cost efficiency using a sample of 
French and Spanish banks. However, due to data limitations, the study has used proxies 
as industry average capital to capture the impact of capital regulation. Gregorian and 
Manole (2002) address bank efficiency on transition countries of Eastern Europe and 
former Soviet Union. The authors also try to understand how capital regulations 
impacted banks performance. In 2005, Fries and Taci used the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development index of banking sector reform to access the impact of 
institutional developments on banks’ cost efficiency for 15 post-communist countries. 
More recently, Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009) conducted an international 
comparison of the three pillars of Basel II on banks’ cost and profit efficiency. 
Regulatory variables on capital requirements were defined using data from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey conducted by the World Bank. 
This thesis has some common aspects with the aforementioned studies, especially with 
Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), as it aims to analyze how capital regulation 
impacts on bank efficiency while controlling for other regulatory and environmental 
variables. It covers both cost and profit efficiency measures because analyzing only a 
single dimension of banking efficiency can be deceptive, as sustained by Guevara and 
Maudos (2002). And give us also an international comparison on how different 
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regulatory, economic, and environmental conditions may turn capital requirements more 
or less relevant in the way banks operate. But the main advantage of our study is to use 
a panel data over the period 2004-2012. This is particularly relevant for three reasons: 
first, while using panel datasets we are expected to obtain more efficient estimators of 
the unknown parameters and more efficient predictors of efficiency estimates (Coelli et 
al., 2005); second, we use a longer time-period than Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis 
(2009), which allow us to capture not only environmental and economic changes over 
time, but also regulatory updates, since we were able to use data from two Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey conducted by the World Bank (2007 and 2011); 
finally, we capture a period that probably encompasses the biggest financial crisis since 
1929. If we want to capture the effect of capital regulation on banking efficiency, which 
is usually designed to define minimum buffers to help banks overcome unexpected 
losses, it will be very useful to analyze how regulation may (or may not) help banks’ 
efficiency in such a stressful economic context. Beltratti and Stulz (2009) found that 
“banks that had higher Tier I capital ratio in 2006 and more deposits generally 
performed better during the crisis”. Instead of using traditional measures of performance 
(e.g. return on equity), our approach will apply efficiency measures which, according to 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), are “particularly valuable in assessing and informing 
government policy regarding financial institutions”. 
The remaining chapters of the thesis are structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an 
overview on the literature on capital, on banks’ capital structure major trends and on 
capital regulation; Chapter 3 presents the methodology and how our dataset was built; 
Chapter 4 discusses the results obtained; and Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 | Related literature and theoretical focus 
2.1. Why is capital important? 
When a company wishes to start an activity, whatever the role and objectives the 
organization may want to accomplish, the firm needs to choose how it will be financed. 
Although there are currently financing approaches which may include several 
instruments with mixed properties, to better understand the role of capital let us assume 
that the firm can only choose between debt – e.g. bonds – and equity (we will refer to 
equity or capital interchangeably). According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), in a 
world without taxes or any other market imperfections, this decision, i.e. the company 
capital structure, should not have any kind of impact on the value of the firm, so it 
would be indifferent the way companies finance their activities. But does this 
conclusion mean that capital would not have any kind of importance? In the real world 
there are taxes and all sort of market imperfections and we realize that firms have 
different capital structures, so using different mixes of debt and capital will certain play 
its role among management decision making processes. Damodaran (2001) states that 
firms’ capital structure should be analyzed on a framework where debt has two 
advantages relative to equity – tax benefits and management discipline. The tax benefits 
come from having a differentiated treatment of costs associated with the debt, namely 
the deduction of interest payments in the calculation of earnings before taxes. 
Management discipline which arises with debt is typically associated with two stylized 
facts: the debt requires mandatory periodic payments (e.g. paying a coupon of a bond); 
and as debt has fixed maturities, it needs to be periodically refinanced which may not be 
achieved at the same cost or not possible at all if it is perceived that management is not 
conducting the firm as efficiently as they could.  
Besides these two advantages, the higher the debt ratio in the financing mix, the higher 
the profitability for the equity stake in the good times. Consider the following example: 
you wish to purchase an asset which returns 105 for each 100 invested in good times. If 
this asset is financed completely with equity, the return for the investor will be equal to 
the return on asset, i.e., 5%. Alternatively, imagine you ask for a loan of 80, for which 
you will have to pay 3 (plus the 80 borrowed). With this second financing approach, the 
remaining 22 (105-83) will be left for the equity holder, which doubles the return on 
equity that may be obtained from the same asset with a 100% equity capital structure.  
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So, if we sum up the two advantages described early with the leverage effect described 
latter, one might think that any operation should be financed with as much debt as 
possible. However, these advantages should be weighed against three costs: bankruptcy 
costs, agency costs, and loss of future financing flexibility (Damodaran, 2001). 
Bankruptcy costs arise before bankruptcy indeed happens and can be somehow defined 
as the additional costs a company faces when somehow it is perceived that something is 
wrong with the firm. Companies’ suppliers may stop conceding any kind of credit, 
customers may reduce the demand for goods or services from a company which may 
fail in the future, and employees may start looking for jobs in other companies. In turn, 
agency costs may arise from the conflict of interests between debt holders and equity 
holders. At high leveraged firms, those conflicts may turn into debt overhang problems, 
which affect not only the company investment decisions – equity holders do not have 
incentive to finance new projects in a highly leverage firm because projects’ value 
added will be largely taken by debt holders – but also any decisions regarding 
deleverage – “even when this would increase the combined value of the firm to 
shareholders and creditors” (Admati et al., 2012). Since not always the actions 
conducted by the management serve equity holders and bond holders, the latter may 
impose additional costs to the firm through covenants or restrictions on assets where 
funds can be applied. Finally, the third cost derives from the loss of future financing 
flexibility which arises when an indebted company loses the capacity to borrow new 
funds to finance new projects.  
So, capital plays an important role in the way firms finance their assets. But let us go 
back to our previous investment example. We said that the asset would return 105 in 
good times. But what would happen if the return in bad times were only 101? On the 
capital structure with 100% equity, the return would be 1%. However, with the second 
capital structure, after paying for the costs of debt, nothing would be left for the equity 
holders (more precisely, equity holders will get a loss of 2, or 10%). So capital has 
played the important role of absorbing losses when bad times arrive. This simple 
example is consistent with what truly happen in companies. Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe 
(2004) highlight that empirically, on average, most of non-financial corporations have 
low debt-assets ratios – a number of firms use no debt at all which sustains the 
important role of capital. An additional feature regarding capital structure which may 
also be found empirically is that it seems there are differences in the capital structures of 
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different industries: Drugs and Electronic firms have low leverage whereas Hotels and 
Lodging and Building Constructing companies have higher debt as a percentage of the 
market value of equity and debt. So, capital structure and the role of equity is one of the 
most debated issues in corporate finance and different theories try to address this 
particular issue – as firm’s life cycle, following a financing hierarchy, or matching 
industry average capital ratio.  
Even though financial institutions are among the most leveraged firms (Berger, Herring 
and Szegö, 1995, Admati et al., 2010), they are somehow set aside when it comes to 
capital structure analysis in corporate finance. This is usually justified by the specificity 
of their activities and by the fact that their capital structure decisions are often 
influenced by regulation. The aforementioned empirical studies quoted from Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe (2004) explicitly excluded financial firms. But are financial firms, 
particularly those who operate in the banking sector, a special case when it comes how 
to choose the best financing mix? Are the advantages and drawbacks associated to the 
use of equity and debt and described early not applied to banks? Ross, Westerfield and 
Jaffe (2004) highlight that although there is no formula to define the optimal capital 
structure for a particular company, three important variables should be considered when 
choosing the financing mix: taxes, types of assets, and uncertainty of operating income. 
The role played by taxes was already addressed, so we will not discuss this topic any 
further. Types of assets may impact the firms’ capital structure in the sense that if a 
company holds illiquid assets, it may not be able to sell them to deal with a situation of 
financial distress. Therefore, ceteris paribus, it is expected that firms with illiquid assets 
– as investment in research and development – hold more capital than firms with liquid 
assets. The uncertainty of operating income may lead to choose less leverage in the 
firm’s capital structure. Otherwise, debt may cause additional pressure on companies' 
volatile cash-flows (remember the example above, where equity played its role as loss 
absorber). 
Damodaran (2001) added three additional variables to the preceding list: the need for 
flexibility, the separation of ownership and management, and debt holders’ difficulty in 
monitoring firm actions, investments, and performance. Holding all other remaining 
variables fixed, if a company foresees the need of decision-making flexibility in the 
future, it is expected that it starts to deleverage. In what concerns to the separation of 
ownership and management, more debt is usually associated to a great separation. 
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Finally, when it comes to the difficulty of debt holders to monitor the firm’s activities, 
the greater the opacity on the company actions, the lower is expected the firm’s leverage 
to be. So, let us exclude taxes because it depends the way tax codes treat the costs 
associated with debt, and not least, it also depends on the firm’s capacity to generate 
earnings in the first place. All other five remaining variables described before seem to 
be a consequence of the “nature of equity claims on the firm’s cash-flows” (Damodaran, 
2001). “Equity claims entitle the holder to any cash-flow left over after meeting all 
other promised claims” (Damodaran, 2001), and, again, that is why capital or equity 
plays an important role on companies: because it acts as a loss-absorber, it is a tool of 
preventing financial distress (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995).  
Hereupon, we have understood the role of equity as a loss absorber and why it is 
important on companies’ capital structure in general. But is there any particularity of the 
banking sector that might be specific that the aforementioned framework on capital 
structure – and the role of capital on it –could not be applied to banks as well? Besides 
everything that has already been said about the role of capital, when it comes to the 
financial industry, it is also important to address two additional features of the banking 
sector that should raise additional red flags on how banks choose their capital structure. 
Banks provide various services to all remaining sectors of the economy. Therefore, a 
bank failure could thus be very costly either to providers or to users of savings 
(Saunders and Cornett, 2011). On one side, a bank failure may destroy households’ 
savings. But a bank failure may also freeze all lending activities leaving firms and 
households without access to credit. Examples of this negative externalities are, 
unfortunately, quite frequent. Even a small doubt about the resilience of a bank may 
drive the entire system into real solvency problems and drag the entire economy with 
them. So a problem with a bank may impact negatively the economic prospects of the 
remaining stakeholders. The second feature is the interdependence. As Rajan (2005) 
recognizes, financial development has turned the system more interconnected “with a 
more pronounced linkage between markets, and between markets and institutions”. 
Admati et al. (2010) support that interconnection magnifies any insolvency problem, 
spreading consequences all over the entire economy. Consequences that are clearly 
translated in prolonged and deeper recessions experienced not only in the past but also 
more recently, as we witnessed after the Lehman Brothers collapse. Similar claims have 
also been supported by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011).  
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Therefore, the capital structure of the financial system, by its particularities and 
idiosyncrasies, should be managed carefully because a problem in one institution can 
jeopardize not only other banks but also households, and companies operating in the 
real economy. As mentioned before, “equity is considered a “cushion” or a “buffer” 
because its holders do not have a hard claim against the issuer” (Admati et al., 2010). 
For the banking sector this idea is even more crucial, given its externalities on the 
economy. In such a crucial way, it became a matter for regulation. But we will address 
the regulation topic later on. We were saying that banks capital structure is a crucial 
matter. However, even though the role of capital might seem as clear as it is essential, 
“one of the most remarkable features of the financial crisis of 2008 was the razor-thin 
capitalization of many of the world’s largest banks” (The Economist, 2014b). Hellwig 
(2010) supports the same claim as well, establishing a connection between fragility and 
interconnections among financial institutions, even though Berger et al. (2008) 
suggested that large banks in the United States were holding capital in excess of the 
minimum required by regulators.  
Despite of its importance to the soundness of each financial institution and, by 
extension, the entire financial system, setting the right equilibrium between equity’s role 
and how much leverage should a bank have generates a lot of controversy in the 
industry and also among regulators. Let us consider, for instance, a bank with capital 
less than 5% of its total assets: this means that for every 100 the bank has invested, it 
will go bankrupt if losses are equal or greater than 5. And in years preceding the 2008 
crisis, equity levels were at historic low with leverage ratios around 50 (The Economist, 
2013). It is possible to look at the capital structure of an institution as its leverage ratio 
or collateral rate of the institution (Geanakoplos, 2010); hence, in the previous example, 
leverage around 50 would mean that banks were financing their operations with capital 
around 2%. So, capital is important for banks – remember that with those capital ratios, 
banks could not absorb losses greater than 2 – because “when banks are highly 
leveraged, even a small decrease in asset value can lead to distress and potential 
insolvency” (Admati et al., 2010). Further, when firms have a great presence of equity 
in their financing mix, typically are “less inclined to make excessively risky investments 
that benefit shareholders and managers at the expense of debt holders and government”, 
and because even “when insolvency is not an immediate problem, following a small 
decrease in asset values, highly-leveraged banks may be compelled to sell substantial 
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amount of assets in order to reduce their leverage, putting pressure on asset markets and 
prices, and thereby, indirectly on other banks” (Admati et al., 2010). So, the equity level 
of each institution may not be a panacea, but it is definitely important, especially for 
banks. It is important for the soundness of the bank itself, which acting on its own 
interest should consider an equity level which allows it to continue to operate even in 
the rainy days. And banks face many incentives to choose not to do so. Bonfim and Kim 
(2012) have analyzed the risk taking behavior of a given bank when other banks are 
following riskier strategies, concluding that in such scenario, there are evidences of 
“herding behavior among the largest banks”. This occurs specially if banks believe that 
“they will be helped out if they face severe difficulties, thus having perverse incentives 
to engage in excessive risk-taking behaviors” (Bonfim and Kim, 2012). Therefore, 
equity levels are also a matter of concern when managing systemic risk. So, regulation 
should not care only about each particular bank operating in the market, but with the 
risk of the entire system, guaranteeing that banks do have capacity to withstand shocks 
because “as the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has compellingly shown, highly leverage 
financial institutions create negative externalities” (Admati et al., 2010) for the entire 
economy. Now that we have a better view on why capital is important, and its crucial 
role on the soundness of banks – and, as consequence, in turning the financial system 
safer –, let us turn our attention to the evolution of capital structure in the banking sector 
and what kind of events might cause it to change. 
2.2. Capital structure in banking: global trend and historical evolution 
Previously, while discussing the role of capital in the financing mix of a firm, we have 
identified a set of variables that may influence the optimal capital structure. Those 
variables included tax codes, type of assets the company holds on its balance sheet, 
uncertainty of firms’ operating income, flexibility to select which projects the company 
should invest in, the separation of ownership and management, and debt holders’ 
difficulty in monitoring firm actions, investments, and performance. For each one of 
them, companies should weigh the costs and benefits associated with distinct capital 
structures. For non-financial corporations, it is expected that in the decision making 
process both debt-holders and equity holders internalize the costs and benefits of such 
variables, so those are not a matter of public concern (Herring, 2011). Therefore, the 
evolution of a specific industry capital structure, if any, may, somehow, be explained by 
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changes in the aforementioned variables and consequently, by the relative costs and 
benefits associated to each one of them.  
However, when it comes to banks’ capital structure, the observable changes over time 
may be explained by something else. Or at least, it is possible to establish some 
correlation between public policy events that helped to create and develop the safety net 
to the banking industry and the continuous increase in leverage within the industry. But 
let us look at the evolution of banks’ capital structure over the last 150 years using data 
from United States banks’ capital structure since 1834 (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 
1995; Herring, 2011) – a similar pattern has been identified in banks from the United 
Kingdom and Germany (Admati et al., 2010), so let us assume that it is quite 
representative of the main trends in the industry. The graph with the United States 
banks’ capital ratio trend for the period 1834-2010 can be found in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 - The evolution of leverage in United States banks (1834-2010) (Herring, 2011) 
 
Looking back to 1834, the first conclusion is that banks’ equity to total assets ratio has 
been quite higher in the past when compared to nowadays levels or the regulatory 
proposals under discussion – minimum total capital of 8% (BIS, 2010a). Starting from 
equity to total assets ratios of 50%, leverage has followed a clear growing trend until 
1940’s. From the 1940’s onwards, equity to total assets ratio has been within a lower 
limit of 6% and an upper limit of 8%. So, what may have contributed to the clear 
descending trend from almost 50% of equity to total assets to only 6% – a decrease of 
almost 90% – on banks’ capital structure in the period 1834-1944? Can the increase in 
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leverage be explained by particular changes on variables identified by corporate finance 
theories?  
According to Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995), this decrease may have started by 
improvements in the financial system. These enhancements included geographic 
diversification, the introduction of money markets, clearinghouses, and mutual 
guarantees associations – allowing banks to access liquidity beyond their own markets. 
This analysis is also supported by Herring (2011), which highlighted the role of 
technology improvements at the time such as the telegraph and national railway 
connections. These set of improvements may have contributed to the decline of the 
probability of financial distress, which, as we saw earlier, can be mitigated also with 
higher capital ratios. Therefore, improvements in the financial system and in technology 
may have been understood as an indicator that less capital was needed and may help to 
explain the initial declining trend in banks’ equity ratios.  
However, due the externalities for the economy of successive financial crisis, public 
policy started to be aware of “the social costs to the general public from banking crises” 
(Haldane, 2010) and introduced regulation with the objective of reducing the probability 
of such happenings. And not only regulation itself, but also the way public policies have 
been answering to each slump, with discretionary bailout decisions, may also influence 
how banks have been choosing their capital structure over time (The Economist, 
2014a).  
Let us again return to the historical data on United States bank’s capital structure to 
analyze if such claims found support in the observable trend (Figure 1). Following the 
National Banking Act in1863, which introduced the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), the increasing trend on banks leverage has accelerated – because 
banks trusted the role of OCC in monitoring national banks – stabilizing capital to 
assets ratio around 25% in 1880’s, i.e., a drop of 50% from 1834 starting point. Again, 
it was another slump caused by the financial system – Knickerbocker crisis (The 
Economist, 2014a) –, that led to the establishment, in United States, of the Federal 
Reserve System in 1913, which should start acting as a lender of last resort. Following 
this improvement of the safety net on the banking system – banks started having a 
discount window where they could have access to liquidity – derived form public policy 
aim to stabilize the banking system, it was observable an immediate drop on banks’ 
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capital to total assets ratio. Besides the contribution of the Federal Reserve System, 
Herring (2011) highlights that the increase in corporate tax that followed the beginning 
of World War I (1914-1918) may also have contributed to increase banks’ leverage, 
which is indeed aligned with corporate finance theory on optimal capital structure. The 
declining trend in banks’ capital ratio is somehow interrupted during the years of the 
great depression – not surprisingly, another financial crisis – in the 1920’s. However, 
“the response to a financial crisis has always followed a familiar pattern, ending by 
entrenching public backing for private markets: other parts of finance deemed essential 
are given more state support” (The Economist, 2014a). Thus, the great depression led to 
another major change in regulation that strengthened even more the safety net designed 
for the financial system and restored the preceding declining trend in banks’ equity to 
total assets ratio. In the early 1930’s it was established the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Commission (FDIC) with the objective to protect depositors of bank failures and avoid 
bank runs (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995; Herring, 2011). Berger, Herring and Szegö 
(1995) sustain that the creation of FDIC “provided an additional subsidy to banking that 
also made uninsured bank debt safer, reducing market capital requirements further”. 
Similar idea is defended by Geanakoplos (2010). Depositors no longer need to monitor 
which bank was safer, since no matter how banks manage their risks, there will always 
be a public fence protecting depositors’ savings. Again, as sustained by the data on 
United States banks’ capital structure, this major regulatory change was followed by an 
acceleration of the declining trend in banks’ equity to total assets ratio, dropping from 
circa 14% to around 6% in 10 years which is a reduction of more than 50%. This drop 
lasted until 1940’s, when capital to total assets stabilized and started fluctuating on a 
6%-8% collar (Figure 2). It remained in this band for almost half century (Berger et al., 
1995), which may be understood as a signal of its success in preventing the main cause 
that led to it: bank runs. On the other hand, as regulation improved the safety net around 
the financial system, it also created “perverse incentives to engage in excessive risk-
taking behaviors” (Bonfim and Kim, 2012) to the extent that allowed banks “to reduce 
costly liquidity and equity buffers” (The Economist, 2014a). 
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Figure 2 - The evolution of leverage in United States banks (1934-1994) (Source: Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation) 
 
In the 1990’s, after a long period where capital ratios remained quite stable, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Improvement Act (FDICIA) forced banks to start slightly decreasing 
leverage (Herring, 2011) because it imposed limits on leverage based on total assets 
(Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995). According to Herring (2011), this change in banks’ 
leverage was only observable in banks which were under United States jurisdiction. 
Banks that needed to comply only with Basel Capital Accord continued with their 
capital to total assets ratio around 6%-8% or even lower. Herring (2011) explained that 
this was due to the arbitrage made on regulation, namely the equity to risk-weighted 
assets ratio which could be easily manipulated. The same argument can also be found in 
Admati et al. (2010) and Hellwig (2010). Cebonyan and Strahan (2004) add that the 
Basel Capital Accord may have contributed to increase leverage rather than reducing 
risk in the banking system as banks were able to define the risk associated to their 
assets. Indeed, financial institutions were reporting 10% core capital, when these figures 
relate equity to risk-weighted assets (Hellwig, 2010). “If the risk weights have not been 
chosen appropriately” Hellwig (2010) claims, the figure proves to be useless. Hence, 
banks may have arrived to the first decade of the twenty first century with even little 
equity, which, according to Hellwig (2010), may have played an important role on the 
severity of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
In short, it is possible to determine three main regulatory changes that, while intended to 
increase banks’ safety net and preventing financial crisis, may have contributed to the 
overall decline in banks’ capital ratios (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995; Herring, 
2011). The first was the creation of an institution to regulate and monitor the usage of 
long term assets as a collateral (e.g. public debt) to access short-term liquidity, as the 
OCC in the United States (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995). While reducing the 
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resulted in an additional source of confidence in the system (Herring, 2011). The second 
important regulatory change was the establishment of a role of lenders of last resort for 
central banks, which were able to provide additional liquidity to the system, helping the 
reduction of risk of financial distress and therefore, creating incentives to diminishing 
bank’s capital ratios. A third regulatory change that may also help to explain the 
continuing overall declining trend on banks’ leverage ratio was the introduction of 
government deposit guarantees. Again, as public policies tried to strengthen the safety 
net on the banking system, banks continued to increase their leverage ratio because 
“implicit government guarantees, as well as underpriced explicit guarantees, constitute a 
distortion that favors debt over equity financing for many financial institutions” 
(Admati et al., 2010). A similar argument was also made by Geanakoplos (2010). And 
even when regulation tried to set minimum capital ratios, as the Basel Capital Accord 
with a system of risk calibrated capital requirements, banks were able to continue 
increasing their leverage (Hellwig, 2010). However, the argument that regulation has 
somehow molded banks’ capital ratio is also a matter of debate. Gropp and Heider 
(2010) claim that banks tend to optimize their capital ratios as any other non-financial 
firm does. Additionally, the authors did not find any empirical evidence of the impact of 
government deposit guarantee on leverage as well. Berger et al. (2008) argue that banks 
choose target capital ratios above regulatory minimum. Thus, although the declining 
trend on banks’ capital ratios over the last 150 years has been accompanied by the 
strengthening of the safety nets designed to protect the financial system, there seems to 
exist empirical evidence that both equity holders and bond holders internalize some of 
the costs and benefits of the chosen capital structure. Meanwhile, Haldane (2010) 
suggests that the internalized costs and benefits do not include all the damage on the 
economy from a financial crisis. The optimal approach to do so is an ongoing debate. 
Tuner (2010) suggests that besides counter-cyclical macro-prudential rules, the most 
important driver of regulation on banking should be an increase of capital requirements 
of the banking system as a whole. However, it is also understood that raising equity 
levels comes with costs associated to it, such as an increase in the cost of funds in 
normal times (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2008). Thus, in the next chapter we will 
analyze the extent to which capital requirements imposed on banks truly affect their 
efficiency. 
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2.3. Capital regulation: does it impact banks’ efficiency? 
As we described early, capital is important because it acts as a loss absorber. This 
feature is particularly vital on the banking industry due to the externalities that a bank 
failure may cause on the economy. However, the long-run global trend on banks’ capital 
ratio has been towards an increase in leverage. Although this increasing trend has been 
interrupted due to regulation on leverage and/ or on minimum capital requirements, the 
2007-2008 crisis has shown that bank capital was not enough to keep trust on interbank 
markets (Hellwig, 2010). Despite of its importance to the soundness of the financial 
system, setting higher equity requirements – or less leverage – generates a lot of 
controversy in the industry, among public policymakers, and among regulators. Even in 
the academia, this topic is a matter of continuous research and debate. For Admati et al. 
(2010), “capital regulation can be a powerful tool for enhancing the role of banks in the 
economy” and “given the experience of the 2007-2008 crisis, it is natural to consider a 
requirement that banks have significantly less leverage” which can be understood as 
setting a higher capital requirement so that assets volatility does not cause distress or 
insolvency. BIS (2010b) have also conducted a study on the long-term economic impact 
of an increase in capital and liquidity requirements. Although this research has 
concluded that the net benefits on the output level would be positive – due to estimated 
positive effects of reducing the probability and severity of banking crisis – BIS (2010b) 
observed that higher capital requirements will increase lending spreads and, 
consequently, the overall economy borrowing costs. The BIS assumption is that equity 
finance is more expensive than debt finance and that the cost of equity and the cost of 
debt are not affected by the change in the riskiness of the bank.  
But before we analyze the extent to which banking efficiency can or cannot be affected 
by setting higher capital requirements, lets us first briefly identify what are the major 
objectives of capital regulation. According to Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008), there 
are four key goals which capital regulation tends to pursue: protecting depositors and 
the rest of the economy from bank failure; align incentives between managers and 
shareholders, because the latter will monitor the former to guarantee that no additional 
risk is being taken; high capital charges for riskier assets, since capital is understood to 
be a preferred way of financing (this has led to the use of risk weighted assets approach 
so that a bank that invests in riskier assets would not be favored with the same financing 
cost than a bank which invests on safer assets); and impose market discipline on banks. 
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As the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 has shown, financial stress in one large 
institution can easily spread around, “causing a credit crunch or an asset price implosion 
(Admati et al., 2010). So capital regulation tries to set minimum capital requirements 
that hopefully will minimize the risk of such happenings, since equity acts as a loss 
absorber. In what concerns aligning incentives between managers and equity holders, 
when managers are compensated based by return on equity, there may be the temptation 
to choose riskier assets – with expected higher returns – in order to achieve special 
bonuses. Setting minimum capital requirements will put a threshold on leverage which 
the management team cannot exceed. Since banks treat capital as an expensive way of 
financing their activity, without a model that allows differentiating among riskier assets, 
relatively safe borrowers will not find financing in any bank. Attributing different risks 
to assets will, in theory, allow capital consumption to be higher when risk is higher 
(Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2008), hence creating incentives for banks to have less risk. 
The forth objective of capital regulation is to impose market discipline on banks. When 
a bank faces an adverse shock, having a minimum capital requirement to comply with 
will make any necessary adjustment clear and “can be said to impose a type of market 
discipline on banks” (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2008).  
Besides the objectives of setting minimum capital requirements explained previously, it 
is also understood that placing constrains on bank’s capital structure will impact banks’ 
efficiency. Several arguments are commonly stated by the industry as well as by the 
academia. Let us group those arguments in three classes: those that harm efficiency due 
to the impact on the provision of financial services; a second set that harm efficiency 
due to the properties of debt; and third group of arguments based on asymmetric 
information theories.  
Among the first class of arguments is that setting higher capital requirements for banks 
will not only diminish the capacity of banks to provide financial services, namely 
providing less loans to the economy or accepting less deposits (Van den Heuvel, 2008), 
but will also push banks to operate at a suboptimal level. Yet, Admati el al. (2010) 
argues that this claim “confuses the two sides of the balance sheet”, since equity, 
besides acting as a loss absorber, represents one way of funding banking activities and 
not “money that banks must be set aside” (Admati et al., 2010). Hence, in what 
concerns the impact of capital requirements on the capability of banks “issuing deposit-
type liabilities” (Van den Heuvel, 2008), i.e. the amount of financial services provided, 
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Admati et al. (2010) defend that there are three kind of strategies a bank may follow, 
while still complying with an increase on capital requirements. One may be through 
balance sheet reduction, which indeed may lead to a decrease in the amount of loans 
conceded and deposits taken. A second approach that may be followed to achieve the 
necessary deleverage is holding the size of the balance sheet fixed, while increasing the 
amount of equity which finances it, by decreasing debt. Finally, a third alternative 
strategy involves the expansion of a bank’s balance sheet, funding it exclusively with 
equity until the required leverage is fulfilled. Therefore, as the second and third 
examples demonstrate, increasing capital requirements does not necessarily lead to a 
decrease in the provision of financial services.  
Regarding the consequence of setting higher regulatory equity requirements on the 
efficient provision of financial services, such claims are backed by the cost of equity. “If 
capital were cheap, banks would be extremely safe because they would hold high levels 
of capital, providing full protection against even extreme events” (Elliot, 2009). 
However, Admati et al. (2010) claim that this kind of argument “reflects a 
misunderstanding of the way in which risks affect the cost of funding”. The required 
expected return on equity is higher than the required expected return on debt reaches out 
to support the argument that funding operations with equity is more expensive than 
funding the asset side of the balance sheet with debt. Hence, the argument goes, a 
banks’ capital structure which holds a greater amount of capital will have a higher 
average cost of funding. Yet, the required expected return on equity is higher because it 
reflects the inherent riskiness of equity – as a residual claim on banks total assets – 
when compared to debt – which is a hard claim on total assets. In this sense, the higher 
a bank’s leverage, the higher will be the required expected return from equity holders. 
And as bond holders assess leverage as a sign of risk, the expected return on debt may 
also increase with leverage. The opposite may also hold. If a bank is funded with more 
equity, the riskiness of cash-flows may indeed be translated into less risk for 
shareholders (Admati et al., 2010). Consequently, the risk premium demanded may be 
reduced. The same may also apply to debt and the required rate of return by 
bondholders. This is what Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown when stated that 
despite all deviations resulting from market imperfections (e.g. taxes), the true financing 
cost should reflect the riskiness of the assets, not the financing mix that was used. 
Therefore, even though all the tax advantages and implicit public subsidies on debt that 
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are in place, setting higher capital requirements needs not necessarily imply a higher 
funding cost to the banking industry (Admati et al., 2010). 
The two aforementioned arguments are somehow based on suboptimal provision of 
financial services and also on not taking advantage of the public framework and 
regulation that treat equity financing less favorably than debt financing. Both may harm 
banks’ efficiency. Let us now review a second set of arguments that are based on the 
properties of debt and its contribution for reducing frictions among banks’ different 
stakeholders. The first characteristic of debt is its role as an informational insensitive 
security. “Debt is the optimal security for trade in funding markets because it is least 
information sensitive and thus best in maintaining symmetric ignorance” (Dang, Gorton 
and Holmström, 2013). So, setting higher capital requirements will contribute to the 
diminishing of the debt amount that banks may issue, and consequently, will impact the 
access to overall liquidity since “only debt-like securities are considered as cash 
equivalents and the only instruments traded in funding markets” (Dang, Gorton and 
Holmström, 2013). Therefore, less debt being issued will also mean less liquidity in the 
markets, and consequently, banks will be less efficiently managed. However, this 
property may no longer hold if there is a significant prospect of failure (Gorton, 2009; 
Admati et al., 2010). If the possibility of default is real, as happened recently with 2007-
2008 financial crisis, debt may become “informationally-sensitive, that is, subject to 
adverse selection because the shock creates sufficient uncertainty as to make 
speculation profitable” (Gorton, 2009). So we might even say that the greater the bank 
leverage, the more exposed to adverse shocks the bank will be. As leverage may drive 
the debt issued by a bank to the collapse, it may not be conclusive that raising equity 
levels may harm banks’ efficiency by diminishing the amount of informational 
insensitive securities issued.  
A second important property of debt is the disciplinary role over management. Since 
setting higher capital requirements may reduce leverage, this may turn into the 
emergence of governance issues that could lead to less efficiency on management and 
consequently on banks’ performance. Admati et al. (2010) has gathered the two main 
lines of arguments that sustain the importance of debt on management discipline: debt, 
as a hard claim, forces management to reduce waste; and debt-finance eliminates moral-
hazard and management risk taking behavior due to the threat of non-rolling existing 
debt. Since debt claims are fully specified in advance, they represent a very strong 
 
- 26 - 
 
commitment to the management team. Hence, “short-term creditors are better protected 
against the actions of wayward bank management (…) and the tendency for banks to 
finance themselves largely with short-term debt may reflect a privately optimal response 
to governance problems” (Kashyap, Rajan and Stein, 2008). Plus, besides being able of 
paying the existing debt, banks face an additional pressure to renew debt at maturity. 
According to Calomiris (1999), “the key to market-discipline approach is placing 
private parties at risk with respect to undesirable behavior by banks”. And this is 
achieved using subordinated debt (Calomiris, 1999). The argument is that if banks take 
excessive risk or manage their assets poorly, they will not be able to renew subordinated 
debt and will be forced to shrink their balance sheets or issue new equity (Calomiris, 
1999). The assumption behind such statement is that management will have to be very 
careful and efficient because otherwise their debt will not be rolled over by existing 
creditors. However, as the recent financial crisis has shown, the kind of governance 
problems that may worry equity holders are those related to excessive risk tanking, 
which may be extended with leverage combined with public safety nets (Admati et al., 
2010). Adrian and Shin (2010) have shown that leverage is strongly procyclical and the 
major United States investment banks were highly leveraged before the 2007-2008 
crisis. Gropp and Heider (2010) found that in the period between 1991 and 2004, banks 
have financed balance sheet growth with non-deposit liabilities, and accordingly to 
Admati et al. (2010), before the 2007-2008 crisis there was a continuous increase on 
short-term debt, namely repo contracts, which were continuously renewed without 
bringing any disciplinary role over management. More than monitor banks’ efficiency, 
short-term lenders seemed to be guided by public information as downgrades of 
mortgage backed securities and of collateralized debt obligations by rating agencies 
(Admati et al., 2010). “Thus, debt only directly provides true discipline in the extreme 
scenario in which refinancing the debt is infeasible due to clear insolvency or sufficient 
uncertainty regarding insolvency to induce market failure” (Admati et al., 2010). Once 
again, it is not clear that setting higher capital requirements will indeed harm banks’ 
efficiency in the long run. 
We have analyzed why increasing capital requirements may harm banks’ efficiency due 
to its impact on the provision of financial services and due to the disciplinary properties 
of debt. Let us now turn to a third category of claims that are related to asymmetric 
information theories (Bolton and Freixas, 2006). Since bank managers know more about 
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their company’s current earnings and investment opportunities than outside investors, 
markets will buy new equity issues only at a large discount from their equilibrium 
values without informational asymmetries. Additionally, as “banks are more difficult to 
understand for outside investors, it is possible that the costs of issuing equity may be 
higher” (Gropp and Heider, 2010). Hence, managers will issue stock, or undertake other 
leverage-decreasing activities, only if they are forced to do so by an earnings shortfall, 
or if voluntarily acting in the pursuit of their own interests. “Thus, because of 
information asymmetries about the true value of bank assets, there is an endogenous 
cost of equity and, by extension, an endogenous cost of bank lending” (Bolton and 
Freixas, 2006). However, this negative effect may be neutralized if discretion was, 
somehow, eliminated. Admati et al. (2010) uses the Troubled Asset Relief Program in 
2009 as an example of regulation which overcomes the asymmetric information issue, 
since it would be mandatory for all banks. Additionally, banks with less leverage may 
be able to generate more profits because they have less interest to bear, leaving more 
earnings to finance the left-hand side of the balance sheet (Admati et al., 2010). 
In short, after reviewing the main purposes of capital regulation, we revisited a set of 
arguments commonly used either by the industry or by the academia to justify why 
capital requirements are associated to banking inefficiency. However, before we move 
on to a synthesis of empirical findings on this subject, let us make a small reference to 
the Swedish banking industry. After the country 1990s banking crisis, Sweden has 
imposed “some of the highest capital ratios in the rich world” (The Economist, 2013b). 
Though regulatory authorities have established a minimum Tier I capital ratio of 12%, 
“Swedish banks are generating among the highest returns on equity among rich-world 
banks” (The Economist, 2013b). Hence, raising capital requirements may neither be the 
necessary nor the sufficient condition to decrease profitability in the banking industry. 
On the contrary, it may even act as an incentive to improve efficiency in the sector 
(Eavis, 2013). Let us then have an overview on empirical and theorethical findings on 
capital regulation and banking efficiency. 
2.4. Capital regulation, equity and banking activity: empirical and 
theoretical findings 
We have analyzed the role of capital in banks’ financing mix, the historical evolution of 
banks’ capital structure and the theoretical impact of capital regulation on banks’ 
efficiency. Nevertheless, to have a clear view on how capital regulation impacts banks 
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activities, let us first address two questions: “what do commercial banks do?” and “why, 
as organizations, should banks perform better than any other organization in doing what 
they do?” According to Hughes and Mester (2008), “the literature on financial 
intermediation suggests that commercial banks, by screening and monitoring borrowers, 
can solve potential moral hazard and adverse selection problems caused by the 
imperfect information between borrowers and lenders”. This is what allows banks to 
write financial contracts and monitor contractual performance. Hughes and Mester 
(2008) highlight banks’ ability to improve information asymmetries between lenders 
and borrowers derived from information collected on borrowers, which allows 
managing risk and monitoring credit performance more efficiently. That is why banks 
do what they do better than any other kind of lender.  
However, the way banks perform more or less efficiently these activities depends on 
many factors. Calomiris and Khan (1991) highlight the importance of demandable debt 
in the financing of banks’ activities, “in an environment of asymmetric information with 
potential for fraudulent behavior on the part of the banker”. Hughes, Mester and Moon 
(2001) argue that “banks’ unique capital structure is the source of their competitive 
advantage in producing information-intensive loans and financial services”. On the 
other hand, Hughes and Mester (2008) emphasize “property rights, legal, regulatory, 
and contracting environments in which banks operate” as the main drivers of banks’ 
efficiency.  
So, assuming that in fact regulation may impact the way banks operate efficiently, let us 
summarize the major empirical and theoretical findings that have been found about 
regulation on equity and banking activity. The literature on this topic is extensive, but 
somehow contradictory. Therefore, it is possible to group the main empirical findings in 
three distinct impacts on banking efficiency: those who have found empirical evidence 
that regulation on capital requirements negatively affects banks’ efficiency; those who 
have concluded that regulation may indeed help banks’ performance; and those who did 
not find any impact of regulation on banks’ activities. 
Starting with authors that have found evidence that regulation on capital requirements 
harm banks’ efficiency, VanHoose (2007) made a literature review on the impact of 
capital regulation on banking activities. Although there does not seem to exist a 
consensus on the subject, the author concluded that “the immediate effects of 
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constraining capital standards are likely to be a reduction in total lending and 
accompanying increases in market loan rates and substitution away from lending to 
holding alternative assets” (VanHoose, 2007). Hence, banks will operate in a 
suboptimal level, transferring these inefficiencies to the real economy. Hellmann, 
Murdoch and Stiglitz (2000) conducted an experiment to assess if an increase on capital 
requirements would lead banks to Pareto equilibrium. The authors concluded that 
although capital requirements reduce gambling incentives, they increase the potential 
scope for gambling in a multi-period time-frame. Therefore, no Pareto equilibrium will 
be achieved, i.e., increasing capital requirements will lead banks to operate less 
efficiently. Van den Heuvel (2008) designed a framework to measure what are the costs 
associated with increasing capital requirements. Although the author recognizes that 
capital requirements “limit the moral hazard on the part of banks that arises due to 
deposit insurance”, it concluded that “this capital requirement is also costly because it 
reduces banks’ ability to create liquidity in equilibrium” (Van den Heuvel, 2008). 
Again, forcing banks to operate at a suboptimal level will lead to inefficiencies, 
impacting the economy as a whole. 
On the opposite side, there are also authors that found empirical evidence that regulation 
on equity may help in improving banks’ efficiency. Berger (1995) studied the 
relationship between capital and earnings using 1983-1989 data. The author found that 
the book value of capital to asset ratio is positively related to the return on equity of 
United States’ banks. Berger (1995) suggested that these results are consistent with the 
expected bankruptcy costs hypothesis. Other important result was found by Beltratti and 
Stulz (2009). The researchers concluded that “banks that had higher Tier I capital ratio 
in 2006 and more deposits generally performed better during the crisis” (Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2009), which may be in line with the role of capital as a cushion to absorb losses. 
The authors also found that bank specific characteristics and risk taking behavior 
seemed to have a greater explanatory power than regulation. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 
(2000) conducted a study on the impact of the economic environment on banks’ 
efficiency comparing two countries – France and Spain. The authors concluded that 
there is a negative relation between the capital ratio and banking costs i.e., better 
capitalized banks tend to produce financial services less costly. According to the 
authors, the explanation could be “the existence of a negative relationship between bank 
risk and bank borrowing costs” (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Also on the same 
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subject and arriving to the same conclusions, Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009) 
conducted a study on the impact of regulation on commercial banks activities. The 
paper included data from banks operating in 74 countries and the authors concluded that 
stricter capital requirements may improve cost efficiency due to two main factors: 
lowering the probability of financial distress, it reduces the risk premium charged to the 
bank by debt holders; and diminishing the interest payments since the activities are now 
financed with more equity.  
Mehran and Thakor (2011) have developed a model to analyze the trade-off between 
costs and benefits of capital on banks. The authors concluded that “total bank value as 
well as various components of bank value is positively correlated with bank capital in 
the cross-section” (Mehran and Thakor, 2011). Also relevant may be the impact on 
banks’ efficiency of debt overhang. Admati et al. (2012) have analyzed the incentives to 
reduce leverage of a firm that has high levels of debt. The researchers found out that due 
to the debt overhang effect, high leverage banks will indeed benefit from setting higher 
capital requirements. The reason is that when leverage is high, management will have 
no incentives to recapitalize, even if that option will be the one that maximizes banks’ 
total value. 
Finally, as aforementioned, it is also possible to find in the literature empirical findings 
that regulation may not impact banks’ activities or efficiency at all. Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2004) used a database on bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries. The 
authors did not find any robust relationship between capital requirements and banking 
activities in a cross-country analysis. On their review of the evolution of the same 
World Bank survey on bank regulation – updated  in 2011 –, the same authors 
concluded that “while many have followed the Basel guidelines and strengthened 
capital regulations and empowered supervisory agencies, existing evidence does not 
suggest that this will improve banking-system stability, enhance the efficiency of 
intermediation, or reduce corruption in lending” (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2012). 
These findings were not influenced by any particular institutional environment. Laeven 
and Levine (2009) have also studied the impact of corporate governance and national 
laws and regulation on banking activities, namely risk taking. The researchers 
concluded that “standard bank regulations, such as capital requirements, supervisory 
oversight, and prompt corrective action policies, do not directly influence risk taking” 
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(Laeven and Levine, 2009), emphasizing the role of corporate governance rather than 
regulation on banking activities. 
So, impact of capital regulation on banks’ activities and efficiency is a matter of 
controversy and distinct empirical findings support different views on the subject. 
Therefore, due to the relevance of the topic, there seems to be both need and 
opportunity to contribute to this topic even further, especially at a time when bank 
regulation is under debate and the 2007-2008 financial crisis showed that improvements 
can be made. Thus, in the next chapter we will move forward to present the 
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Chapter 3 | Method 
3.1. Model description 
According to Hughes and Mester (2008), there are two broad approaches to explain 
banks’ performance. The nonstructural approach uses “a variety of financial ratios that 
capture various aspects of performance, while the structural approach, “relies on a 
theoretical model of the banking firm and a concept of optimization” (Hughes and 
Mester, 2008). The former investigate technology by trying to find correlation between 
performance and investment strategies or focusing on bank’s product mix, or correlation 
between performance and the quality of bank’s governance (Hughes and Mester, 2008). 
The latter focus on the role of banks “as a financial intermediary that produces 
informationally intensive financial services” and it “usually relies on the economies of 
cost minimization or profit maximization” (Hughes and Mester, 2008). As Berger and 
Humphrey (1992), Berger and Mester (1997), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), 
Maudos et al. (2002), Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), among others, we will 
follow the structural approach for this research. Two different efficiency concepts will 
be specified and studied: the cost efficiency and the alternative profit efficiency. 
According to Maudos et al. (2002), it has been observed that banks of similar size do 
not necessarily have the same average costs. Therefore, cost efficiency analysis “has 
been a much more important potential source of cost reduction than the achievement of 
an optimum size of production for minimizing average costs” (Maudos et al., 2002). 
The cost efficiency function uses a vector of input prices and output levels. It assumes 
that the observed output level is already profit maximizing (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). However, minimizing costs is not a sufficient condition to achieve profit 
efficiency. Hence, it will be useful modeling a profit frontier to evaluate the impact of 
capital regulation on this dimension as well. It will be used the alternative profit concept 
instead of the profit concept because the former suits better in cases where there are 
significant differences in the size of banks in the sample and also in situations where 
firms exercise some market power (Berger and Mester, 1997). Furthermore, Maudos et 
al. (2002) and Kasman and Yildirim (2006) pointed out that the alternative profit 
efficiency is more appropriate when international comparisons are being made because 
it accommodates different competition degrees and the impact of output quality on 
revenues, which is also the case. The alternative profit frontier uses also a vector of 
input prices and output levels. The cost efficiency and the alternative profit efficiency 
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concepts have also been applied in the literature by Berger and Mester (1997), Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas (2000), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009). Still, Berger 
and Mester (1997) have found “that the choices made concerning efficiency 
measurement usually make very little difference”, concluding that “the efficiency 
estimates are fairly robust to differences in methodology”.  
Hereupon, we will assess the impact of regulatory capital requirements on banking 
efficiency using the Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier production function for 
panel data to estimate inefficiency effects. This model “provides estimates of efficiency 
in a single-step in which firm effects are directly influenced by a number of variables” 
(Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009). According to Battese and Coelli (1995), early 
papers on stochastic frontier production functions adopted a two-stage approach in 
which the stochastic frontier was estimated in the first step and the inefficiency terms 
were estimated in a second step. However, Coelli et al. (2005) highlight that using a 
single step model makes the second step unnecessary. Additionally, if environmental 
variables are excluded in the first step, it will lead to biased estimators for the 
deterministic part of the frontier. As a consequence, one will also obtain biased 
estimations for the efficiency terms as well. As aforementioned, our purpose is to 
compare the impact of different capital regulation applied among countries. Therefore, 
as described by Berger and Humphrey (1997), the efficiency frontiers will be “formed 
from the complete data set across nations allowing for a better comparison across 
nations, since the banks in each country would be compared against the same standard”. 
According to Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009) this approach will “allow the 
estimation of a global frontier while accounting for cross-country differences”. Hence, 
consider the following general form for the cost model for panel data: 
ln 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶(𝑞𝑖,𝑡, 𝑝𝑖,𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,   𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the bank i total cost at time t; 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the outputs vector; 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 designates a 
vector of input prices specified according with a suitable functional form; 𝛽 is a vector 
of unknown parameters to be estimated; 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 are random errors, assumed to be i.i.d. and 
have 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2); and 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 are the nonnegative inefficiency effects in the model which are 
assumed to be independently (but not identically) distributed, such that 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is obtained 
by truncation (at zero) of the 𝑁(𝑚𝑖,𝑡, 𝜎𝑢
2) distribution where the mean is defined by: 
(1) 
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𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,𝑡𝛿 
where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is a (1 × 𝑀) vector of observable explanatory variables that influence the 
efficiency of bank i at time t; and 𝛿  is an (𝑀 × 1) vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
In the cost model, the inefficiency term defines how far banks conduct their activities 
above the cost frontier (Coelli, 1996).  
The alternative profit model for panel data can be described as: 
ln 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃(𝑞𝑖,𝑡, 𝑝𝑖,𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡,   𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the bank i profit at time t. All the remaining parameters of the alternative 
profit model take similar descriptions to the cost model, as well as 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 for the 
nonnegative inefficiency effects. In the alternative profit model, the inefficiency effects 
determine how far banks operate below the profit frontier (Coelli, 1996). Again, as in 
the cost model, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the 𝑁(𝑚𝑖,𝑡, 𝜎𝑢
2) distribution 
where the mean is defined by: 
𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,𝑡𝛿 
where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛿 are defined as abovementioned. The parameters of equations (1), (2), 
(3), and (4) are estimated in one step using maximum likelihood according to the 
Battese and Coelli (1995) specification, as described in Coelli (1996). Individual bank 
inefficiency scores were computed from the estimated frontiers. The measures of cost 
efficiency relative to the cost frontier are defined as: 
𝐶𝐸𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑢𝑖) 
and will take a value between one and infinity. In the case of the measure of the 
alternative profit efficiency relative to the alternative profit frontier, it will be computed 
as follows: 
𝑃𝐸𝑘,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖) 
and will take values between zero and one. As Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), 
to make comparisons easier, we will calculate the cost efficiency index as: 
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Hence, both profit and cost will assume values between zero and one, and the closer the 
score is to one, the higher the efficiency level. 
Concerning the efficiency frontier specifications, it will be followed the structural 
approach, using output levels and input prices (Berger and Mester, 1997). As Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Maudos et al. (2002), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis 
(2009), it was followed the value added approach, which “considers all liability and 
asset categories to have some output characteristics rather than distinguishing inputs 
from outputs in a mutually exclusive way” (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). Therefore, as 
Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009) and others, we have chosen the following 
outputs: loans (Q1), other earning assets (Q2), and total deposits – customer and 
interbank – (Q3). Because there is controversy in the literature regarding the variable 
deposits being defined as an output in efficiency models (Hughes, Mester and Moon, 
2001), we have also specified two parallel frontiers which will be discussed later. Also 
consistently with research on banking efficiency, we have chosen three inputs prices: 
cost of borrowed funds (P1), computed as the ratio of interest expense on total deposits 
plus long-term debt; cost of physical capital (P2), derived as the ratio of general and 
administrative expenses (excluding salaries and employee benefits) on net fixed assets; 
and cost of labor (P3) calculated by dividing salaries and employee benefits on total 
assets. Similar approaches were followed by Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Maudos 
et al. (2002), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009).  
As dependent variables, the cost frontier model will use the sum of interest expense and 
non-interest expense as banks’ total cost (TC), and the alternative profit frontier model 
will use, as dependent variable, the profit before taxes (PBT). As commonly followed in 
the literature, linear homogeneity restrictions were imposed by normalizing the 
dependent variables TC and PBT and all input prices P1, P2, and P3 by the third input 
price (P3). Besides input prices and output levels, as Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis 
(2009), we use a year dummy variable in both cost and alternative profit frontiers to 
account for changes in technology over time. Moreover, as Berger and Mester (1997) 
and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), we use equity (E) to control for “different 
risk preferences on the part of banks” (Berger and Mester, 1997). Finally, also for 
controlling differences on the banks’ size in the spirit of Maudos et al. (2002), it was 
added to both cost and alternative profit frontiers the variable total assets (A). As 
Maudos et al. (2002), Fries and Taci (2005), Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, (2009), 
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and others, we will use the multi-product translog specification which results in the 
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) + 𝛽35 ln(𝐴) ln(𝐸) + 𝛽36𝐷2004 + 𝛽37𝐷2005 + 𝛽38𝐷2006 +
𝛽39𝐷2007 + 𝛽40𝐷2008 + 𝛽41𝐷2009 + 𝛽42𝐷2010 + 𝛽43𝐷2011 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
In the above expression, the logarithm of the cost of production is function of a vector 
of input prices (P1, P2, and P3) and outputs (Q1, Q2, and Q3), while controlling for 
bank size (A), leverage (E), and yearly technological evolution (year dummies). The 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
is interpreted as technical inefficiency effects which cause banks to operate above the 
stochastic cost frontier. The alternative profit frontier model will follow the same 
specification as the cost frontier model, but with ln (
𝑃𝐵𝑇
𝑃3
) as dependent variable and the 
inefficiency term 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 preceded by a minus sign – since we are trying to determine how 
below the efficient frontier bank i is operating. In both the cost frontier and the 
alternative profit frontier, the inefficiency term is a function of regulatory variables – 
CAPTRQR, OFFDPWR, MKTDISC, and ACTRSTR –, of macroeconomic conditions – 
INFLATN and GDPGRCP –, of financial development variables – DCPSGDP and 
MKTCGDP –, of the environmental framework – FOREIGN, GOVERN, CONCENT, 
and DEVELOP –, and of bank specific variables – ROA, LTD, LLT, ETA, and CTI.  
In equations (2) and (4), 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 will be specified as: 
(8) 
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𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑄𝑅 + 𝛿2𝑂𝐹𝐹𝐷𝑃𝑊𝑅 + 𝛿3𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 + 𝛿4𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑇𝑅 +
𝛿5𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑁 + 𝛿6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐶𝑃 + 𝛿7𝐷𝐶𝑃𝑆𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛿8𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛿9𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 +
𝛿10𝐺𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑁 + 𝛿11𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛿12𝐷𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑃 + 𝛿13𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛿14𝐿𝑇𝐷 + 𝛿15𝐿𝐿𝑇 +
𝛿16𝐸𝑇𝐴 + 𝛿17𝐶𝑇𝐼 
where CAPTRQR is an index of regulatory capital requirements; OFFDPWR is a 
measure of power of the supervisory agencies, MKTDISC is an indicator of market 
discipline, and ACTRSTR refers to the level of restrictions imposed on banking 
activities. Combined, and besides capital requirements, these three later variables 
control for the regulatory framework. 
We will now discuss briefly these regulatory variables – capital requirements plus the 
regulatory control variables –, while detailed information on how each regulatory 
variable was effectively built is provided in Appendix I. Inputs for regulatory variables 
were obtained in the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS), carried out by 
the World Bank. This survey aims to collect information on regulation and supervisory 
practices on more than 100 countries, allowing cross-country comparisons. The data is 
collected from national regulatory authorities and was first released in 2001, being 
subsequently updated in 2003, 2007, and 2011. Therefore, beside cross-country 
comparisons, it also allows examining regulatory trends and how supervision authorities 
react to meaningful economic events. The last version of the survey gathers some 270 
questions on subjects as capital, auditing requirements, governance, etc. That said, 
CAPTRQR is an index of capital requirements and includes questions from both initial 
and overall capital stringency as in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), and Pasiouras, 
Tanna and Zopounidis (2009). According to Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), initial 
capital stringency tries to reflect what kind of funds can be used to finance banking 
activity initially and if the regulatory authorities validate the different sources. Overall 
capital stringency variables include questions which aim to indicate “whether the capital 
requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses from 
capital before minimum capital adequacy is determined” (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 
2004). Since the BRSS 2011 has updated some questions of the BRSS 2007, in order to 
maintain comparability between both surveys, CAPTRQR will take values between 0-6 
– and not between 0-8 as in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), and Pasiouras, Tanna and 
Zopounidis (2009) – with higher values meaning more stringent capital requirements.  
(9) 
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OFFDPWR is a measure of the power of the supervisory authorities in each country and 
tries to indicate “whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct problems” (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). The variable 
can take values between 0-12 to keep a degree of consistency between the 2007 and the 
2011 surveys. Higher values indicate greater power of the supervisory authorities. 
MKTDISC is a measure of market discipline and can take values between 0-8, with 8 
meaning higher disclosure obligations and greater incentives to private monitoring 
(Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009). For the variables CAPTRQR, OFFDPWR, 
and MKTDISC the final value was obtained by the summation of the qualified answers 
as in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), and 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2012). Finally, ACTRSTR is an indicator of the restrictions 
imposed on banking activities. Variables can take values between 1-4, being 1 
“unrestricted” and 4 “prohibited” and the final score will be the average value of the 
four activities monitored (Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009). 
INFLATN is the annual percent change in the consumer price index and GDPGRCP is 
the annual percent change on gross domestic product (GDP) at constant prices. Both 
variables control for macroeconomic conditions following the approach of Maudos et 
al. (2002), Kasman and Yildirim (2006), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009); 
DCPSGDP accounts for the share of domestic credit to private sector on GDP while 
MKTCGDP is the ratio of market capitalization of listed companies to GDP. Both 
control for financial development as in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004), Kasman and 
Yildirim (2006), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009); FOREIGN is the 
percentage of foreign owned banks in the economy, GOVERN is the percentage of 
government owned banks operating in the country, and CONCENT is the assets of the 
three largest commercial banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. These 
three variables control for countries’ market structure in the spirit of Caprio and Levine 
(2004), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009); DEVELOP is a dummy variable 
to control for the state of economic development as in Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis 
(2009); ROA is bank return on assets, LTD is the percentage of loans to total deposits, 
LLT is the percentage of loan losses to total loans, ETA is the percentage of equity to 
total assets, and CTI is the efficiency ratio, measured as cost-to-income. All these five 
remaining variables were included as bank specific control variables in the spirit of 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Maudos et al. (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and 
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Levine (2004), and Laeven and Levine (2009). We will detail how these variables were 
computed in the next section.  
3.2. Data, assumptions and variables definition 
To select the countries for our sample, we have picked those that have participated in 
the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) conducted by the world bank. 
Starting from the countries included in the BRSS 2007 and 2011 and for which we were 
able to find data to compute all other country specific variables aforementioned, we 
arrive at a short-list of 65 countries. We then construct a sample considering all the 
publicly quoted commercial banks in Bloomberg that operate in those 65 countries. The 
focus on publicly quoted banks is supported by Laeven and Levine (2009) since it 
“enhances comparability” (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Additionally, according to 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) selecting only commercial banks has two 
advantages: the regulatory data from the World Bank Surveys are about commercial 
banks, so there will be consistency between bank specific data and regulatory variables; 
and commercial banks tend to be more homogeneous in terms of services, and 
consequently on inputs and outputs. From the 65 countries, we obtained 1196 banks 
from Bloomberg. Then, it was excluded from our sample bank-year observations for 
which at least one of the bank-specific variables was missing. Our final sample 
comprises 156 banks from 30 countries, for which there is at least one year with bank 
specific variables in the period 2004-2012. This results in an unbalanced dataset of 865 
bank-year observations (considering a specification slightly different, the dataset would 
increase substantially. We will address this topic later on when discussing the research 
limitations). 
Excluding the ratios already computed by Bloomberg – return on assets and cost to 
income, which directly map the variables ROA and CTI – all the remaining bank-
specific monetary variables were obtained from Bloomberg in USD. Since some banks 
in our sample have negative profits before taxes (i.e. losses) and negative equity, we 
follow a common approach in the literature (Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; Pasiouras, 
Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009) which consists on adding a constant to the extracted 
profits before taxes and equity values to assure that all values were positive, thus 
allowing natural logarithms to be taken. Calculation rules for each bank specific 
variable are fully detailed in the Appendix II. As Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis 
(2009), we converted the amounts in real (2009) terms using a GDP deflator collected 
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from International Monetary Fund (IMF) – World Economic Outlook Database. Also 
from the IMF, it was collected the data for the macroeconomic variables, i.e., the annual 
percent change in the consumer price index, which will be used as the control variable 
INFLATN, and the annual percent change on GDP at constant prices, which will be 
used as the control variable GDPGRCP.  
As detailed in the previous section, the regulatory variables on capital requirements, on 
power of the supervisory agencies, on market discipline and on restriction on banking 
activities – CAPTRQR, OFFDPWR, MKTDISC, and ACTRSTR – were computed with 
data from the BRSS 2007 and BRSS 2011. Since data is not available on an annual 
basis, it was assumed the BRSS 2007 score for the period 2004-2006 and the BRSS 
2011 data for the remaining years of the analysis (2007-2012).  
To control for the impact of financial development on banks’ efficiency, it was collected 
data on domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP – DCPSGDP – and on 
market capitalization of listed firms (also as percentage of GDP) – MKTCGDP – from 
the World Bank database for the period 2004-2012. 
The variables to control for market structure were obtained from two sources. The 
percentage of government owned banks operating in each country – variable GOVERN 
– was extracted from BRSS 2007 and BRSS 2011. Since data was not on an annual 
basis, it was followed the same approach as in the regulatory variables, i.e., data from 
the 2007 survey were applied to the period 2004-2006 and data from the 2011 survey 
were assigned to the 2007-2012 period. Data on bank concentration and on foreign 
owned banks in the market, variables CONCENT and FOREIGN respectively, were 
obtained from the World Bank database. The former had only data available for the 
period 2004-2011, so it was assumed for 2012 the values of 2011 or the latest. For the 
later, data was only available for the period 2004-2009, so the values from 2009 were 
also mapped to the period 2010-2012. 
Finally, for the dummy variable which indicates the state of economic development 
between advanced and developing economies, it was used the IMF country 
classification. For more detail on how countries were distributed regarding state of the 
economy development and also geographical regions, please refer to Appendix III. In 
the next subsection we will present the characterization of the sample, both on bank 
specific and on country specific data. 
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3.2.1. Sample presentation 
Our sample has 156 banks from 30 different countries. Overall, we have an unbalanced 
panel data of 865 bank-year observations. On our analysis period (2004-2012), it is 
possible to observe in our sample two different trends for total assets and equity mean 
book values (Figure 3 – amounts in $ millions expressed in real 2009 terms; assets and 
equity amounts are prior to any adjustment
1
). Until 2008, the sample average balance 
sheet has been increasing, peaking above $169 billion. After 2008, the amount of assets 
under management has been decreasing until 2011, and on average, has reached circa 
$133 billion, which is a reduction of more than 21%. In 2012, the sample average 
balance sheet has slightly expanded to $136 billion. In terms of equity book value, we 
can see that from 2004 to 2005, there was an increase in average leverage, since the 
amount of equity has declined while assets under management always increased in the 
period 2004-2008. In 2008, probably as a result from the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the 
average equity level dropped, after increasing in the period 2005-2007. 
Figure 3 - Sample mean values by year | Assets and Equity 
 
After 2008, average equity book value has followed a trend similar to total assets. 
However, at the end of the period, the implicit average leverage in our sample has 
declined from circa 17.6 to 16.1. Panel A and Panel B of Table 1 shows the sample 
average values by year and by geographical region for bank specific variables. 
                                                 
1
 To compute efficiency frontiers, a constant was added to the extracted profits before taxes and equity 
amounts to assure that all values were positive, thus allowing natural logarithms to be taken. 
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Table 1 - Sample means of bank specific variables 
 
From the sample averages, it is possible to conclude that the credit granted has peaked 
in 2008, and has been declining from then until 2011. On average, the amount of loans 
in 2012 is less than in 2006. Although the bank-year observations are more concentrated 
on Latin America and Caribbean, and Developing Asia, the largest banks are those 
belonging to Advanced Economies (Euro Area and Other Advanced). Let us look at 
some statistical measures of central tendency, location and dispersion to help us 
characterize better our sample on Table 2. 
Table 2 - Sample characterization of bank specific variables 
  
Whatever the variable peaked, our sample seems to be positively skewed since the 
median is clearly bellow the sample mean. In what concerns location, 75% of our 
sample has less than $29.7 billion of loans, while the maximum value of the sample for 
the same variable exceeds $1.4 trillion. In terms of dispersion, the variable that has a 
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wider relative dispersion is the profits before taxes, with the coefficient of variation 
higher than 5. On the opposite side, the bank specific variable with less relative 
dispersion is the cost of labor with a coefficient of variation of 0.7. 
Moving forward to the bank specific ratios that will be used in the efficiency term of the 
models, in Figure 4 we can see the trend on the ratios loan to deposits and equity to total 
assets. In the time frame 2004-2012, the observable trend on both variables is moving 
towards less leverage: on average, there has been more equity financing banks’ 
activities – from circa 8.4% on 2005, ETA was almost 9.5% on 2012; the 
transformation ratio of deposits into loans is also decreasing – from 92.8% on 2004, 
LTD reached 79.3% in 2012. 
Figure 4 - Sample mean values by year | LTD and ETA 
 
Table 3 has the average values of the bank specific ratios by year and geographical 
region. On Panel B it is clear that the banks in our sample with higher leverage are in 
Advanced Economies: ETA 5.42% for Euro Area and 6.5% for Other Advanced 
Economies; LTD exceeding 101% for both. It is also in these two regions where, on 
average, the assets under management were less profitable: -0.05% on Euro Area and 
0.6% on other Advanced Economies while the sample mean was 1.06%. 
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Table 3 - Sample means of bank specific ratios 
 
3.2.2. Major regulation trends and how it impacts the explanatory variables 
selection 
This thesis tries to find out if there is empirical evidence that regulation on capital 
requirements affects banks’ efficiency. However, due to the negative externalities that 
the financial sector has on the rest of the economy – something already addressed 
previously in the literature review –, the regulatory framework does not comprise only 
capital requirements, but also several other aspects. According to Barth, Caprio and 
Levine (2012), there was a decrease on the toughness of the restrictions on banks 
activities until 2006, something that started reversing more recently. In what concerns 
the remaining three regulatory variables, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2012) concluded 
that “many more countries were increasing capital requirements over the entire period, 
whereas there is no marked difference in the increase or decrease of supervisory powers 
and slightly fewer countries increasing private monitoring compared with those 
decreasing it”. Let us now move on to our sample and understand how the regulatory 
variables are spread over the different regions using Table 4. 
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Table 4 - Sample means of regulatory variables by location 
  
Countries from Developing Asia are among those with higher scores in the regulatory 
variables, excluding the market discipline index where the region has only the third 
highest score. The restrictions on bank activities tend to be lower on Advanced 
Economies, while the powers of the supervisory authorities tend to be lower in countries 
from Eastern and Central Europe. Finally, regulation on capital requirements tends to be 
lower on Other Advanced Economies (excluding countries from Euro Area), while 
Developing Asia and Middle East and African countries have, on average, stringent 
capital requirements. 
3.2.3. Macroeconomic, financial development and market structure variables 
When studying the impact of capital regulations on banks’ efficiency, besides 
controlling for other forms of regulation on the banking sector and for bank specific 
ratios on performance, credit quality, solvency and efficiency, the literature on the 
subject suggests to control also for macroeconomic conditions, for the maturity of 
financial development, and for variables that characterize the market structure faced by 
banks in the countries where they operate as in Fries and Taci (2005), and Pasiouras, 
Tanna and Zopounidis (2009). We defined different variables to control for these items. 
Let us briefly look at how these are distributed in our sample. Table 5 aggregates the 
mean values by geographical region. 
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Table 5 - Sample means for macroeconomic, financial development and market structure variables by location 
  
The Advanced Economies in our sample faced a slower average growth rate, while also 
experiencing lower inflation. Concerning financial development variables, Middle East 
and African Economies have the lowest scores, while the Advanced Economies 
(excluding the Euro Area) have the higher ratios for domestic credit to private sector (% 
GDP) – 1.75 – and for market capitalization of listed countries (% GDP) – 1.74. 
Regarding the market structure variables, our sample suggests that Advanced 
Economies have a higher degree of market concentration with circa 75%-77% of total 
commercial banking assets being managed by the market three largest banks. 
Economies from Developing Asia are those with a higher percentage of government 
owned banks and foreign owned banks in the sample with 38.6% and 48%, respectively. 
On the opposite side, the Euro Area has the smaller percentage of government owned 
banks – 10.3% – and foreign owned banks operating in the market – 23.1%.  
3.3. Limitations 
The measurement of banks’ efficiency varies substantially across the literature due to 
data sources, as well as the efficiency concepts measured (Berger and Mester, 1997). As 
aforementioned, we opt for applying the cost concept and the alternative profit concept 
to assess banks’ efficiency. The later was applied due to several constrains in our 
sample, as explained by Maudos et al. (2002), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis 
(2009). But by doing so, we have not applied a more accepted economic goal which is 
profit maximization, a superior efficiency concept (Berger and Mester, 1997). The main 
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advantage of the profit concept is that efficiency is measured against the “best practice 
point of profit maximization within the dataset” (Berger and Mester, 1997), while both 
cost and alternative profit concepts hold output fixed regardless of being an optimum 
point or not. Concerning the estimation technique, the stochastic frontier captures the 
observed best practice, not necessarily the best possible performance (Hughes and 
Mester, 2008). So, here the efficiency is always measured against the more efficient 
observation in the sample, not against an optimal theoretical point. However, the usage 
of the stochastic frontier – a parametric method – corresponds well with the efficiency 
concepts  – cost and alternative profit – outlined above (Berger and Mester, 1997) and 
focuses on economic optimization – as opposed to technological optimization.  
Regarding the functional form chosen for the stochastic frontiers, we use the translog, 
which is commonly applied in the literature (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Fries and 
Taci, 2005; Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009). However, the translog function 
“does not necessarily fit well data that are far from the mean in terms of output size or 
mix” (Berger and Mester, 1997). To lighten these less favorable characteristics, some 
flexibility may be added to the translog function. This objective could be achieved with 
Fourier trigonometric terms (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
For the countries that participate in both surveys on regulation – 2007 and 2011 – and 
for which it was also possible to get all the necessary country specific variables, it was 
made an effort on mapping and standardizing the answers collected in 2007 and 2011 
surveys to allow comparisons and construct consistent variables over time. Due to the 9 
year time span that we wish to obtain, many countries were lost because we were not 
able to gather country specific variables to all of them. After this stage, we end up with 
65 countries.  In what concerns the bank specific variables used as inputs and outputs in 
the efficiency frontier, there was a trade-off between the chosen specification and data 
availability from Bloomberg. Initially, we chose to create a dataset as comprehensive as 
possible. Since data available on Bloomberg often exclude differentiation for non-
financial costs between labor cost and general and administrative expenses, we also 
worked with an empirical specification that included only two input prices – cost of 
borrowed funds (P1) and non-financial costs (P2). A similar approach was also followed 
by Fries and Taci (2005) and the motivation was the same: lack of available data. This 
approach allows us to get a dataset with 1005 cross-sections from 53 different countries, 
totalizing 7384 bank-year observations. Nevertheless, besides differences in cross-
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sections, countries and variables specification, the broader dataset has higher dispersion. 
This characteristic impacts the performance and the results obtained with the translog 
function as claimed by Berger and Mester (1997) and Berger and Humphrey (1997).  
Other topic that usually is a matter of debate in the literature on banking efficiency is 
the role of deposits in the models. On this topic, the approach followed in this study was 
the value added approach which “considers all liability and asset categories to have 
some output characteristics rather than distinguishing inputs from outputs in a mutually 
exclusive way” (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). According to Berger and Humphrey 
(1992), this controversy on deposits is a consequence of banks’ services not being 
explicitly priced. Because of regulation or institutional reasons, banks pay below market 
interest rates and do not charge explicit fees on deposits services. If the opposite 
happened, i.e., if banks paid market interest rates and charged explicit fees on deposits, 
“then this large explicit revenue flow would be convincing evidence that deposits 
provide substantial service output” (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). Therefore, to assess 
if the value added approach on variable definition could have impacts on the tendency 
showed by our research results, we have also replicated the cost and the alternative 
profit frontiers but excluding deposits from output variables. With such specification, 
capital regulation is not statistically different from zero as a determinant of inefficiency 
either on cost or profit frontiers for our sample. 
Finally, it has been a matter of concern on efficiency analysis how to incorporate banks’ 
capital structure, due to its impact on banks’ risk taking and, consequently on banks’ 
returns (Hughes and Mester, 2008). Although this dimension has been included in our 
study, the chosen capital structure may have the objective of maximizing management 
utility and not bank value. Hughes and Mester (2008) highlight that efficiency structural 
models start including variables related to bank governance and ownership structure as 
in Hughes, Mester and Moon (2001). Poor management quality has been identified as 
one of the main reasons for bank failure (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Regarding 
governance, the cost and alternative profit models applied in our study will assume little 
agency problems between managers and owners. Both stakeholders – management and 
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Chapter 4 | Results 
4.1. Efficiency scores 
After determining the efficiency frontiers for both cost and alternative profit models, the 
mean efficiency scores for our sample are summarized in Table 6: Panel A with the 
scores by year; Panel B with efficiency scores by geographical region; Panel C with 
efficiency means by bank size. 
Table 6 - Cost and profit efficiency estimates 
 
The sample means cost efficiency score was 0.9260, while sample means alternative 
profit efficiency was 0.7598. As in Guevara and Maudos (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), 
and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), our results indicate that, on average, 
banks demonstrate to be more cost efficient than profit efficient when compared with 
the most efficient bank within the sample data. Over the analysis period, the average 
efficiency results have not always followed the same pattern (Figure 5). Cost efficiency 
scores have, on average, improved from 2004 to 2007 and from 2009 to 2011. The year 
2007 was, on average, the year with the best cost efficiency estimates from our sample – 
0.9335. However, 2012 ended with the third best cost efficiency score – 0.9301 – only 
bellow 2007 and 2011.  
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Regarding profit efficiency estimates, they indicate that, on average, banks in our 
sample improved their profit efficiency in three different time periods: 2005-2006, 
2008-2009, and 2011-2012. The year with, on average, the lowest profit efficiency 
estimate was 2008 – 0.7121 -, while 2006 was the year with the highest profit efficiency 
estimates: 0.7780.  
Figure 5 - Efficiency estimates, 2004-2012 
 
Regarding the efficiency estimates by geographical region, our results show that banks 
from other Advanced Economies (excluding the Euro Area) are the most cost efficient – 
0.9668. On the opposite side, banks from Latin America and Caribbean are 
simultaneously the least efficient on the cost side and also on the profit side – 0.8849 
and 0.6470, respectively. In the remaining geographic regions, over the analysis period, 
it is possible to observe that banks in the Euro Area are, on average, more cost efficient 
than banks from Middle East and Africa and East Europe – 0.9391 vs. 0.9169 and 
0.9204, respectively. However, both Middle East and Africa banks and East Europe 
banks have, on average, a better efficiency estimates on profit efficiency than the Euro 
Area banks – 0.8508 and 0.8177 vs. 0.8025, respectively.  
Considering the distribution by size, the most cost efficient banks are, on average, those 
with balance sheets between $10 and $20 billion, while the most profit efficient are, on 
average, banks with total assets between $50 and $100 billion. These results are 
consistent with the literature, – e.g. Berger and Mester (1997); Guevara and Maudos 
(2002); and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009) – which suggests that the most 
efficient banks on the cost side are not necessarily the most profit efficient. To assess if 
there is correlation within our cost and profit efficiency estimates, as in Pasiouras, 
Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), we have computed the Pearson coefficient – for linear 
correlation – and the Spearman coefficient – for non-linear correlation. The coefficients 
obtained are low: 0.1321 for the Pearson coefficient and 0.0321 for the Spearman 
coefficient as presented in Table 7. Although low, the Pearson coefficient is statistically 
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different from zero for a confidence level of 99%. Conversely, the Spearman coefficient 
is not statistically different from zero for the confidence levels commonly applied. 
Hence, the correlation does not seem very strong. This might support the claim from 
Guevara and Maudos (2002) “that the analysis of cost efficiency offers only a partial 
view of the efficiency of a banking firm and consequently the need to analyze also 
inefficiencies in profits”. 
Table 7 - Pearson and Spearman coefficients 
 
Drilling down the analysis to country level, we find that, on average, the most cost 
efficient banks are in Cyprus, Denmark, and United Kingdom, with average cost 
efficiency estimates of 0.9802, 0.9753, and 0.9730, respectively. The least cost efficient 
banks from our sample operate in Mexico, Morocco, and Nigeria, with average cost 
efficiency estimates of 0.6981, 0.7468, and 0.7946, respectively. In terms of profit 
efficiency, those which, on average, had the best efficiency estimates are in Finland, 
Switzerland, and Denmark – 0.9495, 0.9285, and 0.9246, respectively. On the opposite 
side, as the least profit efficient, are banks from United States, Brazil, and Portugal, 
with estimates of 0.2785, 0.5015, and 0.7151. The efficiency estimates by country can 
be found in the Appendix IV. Having the cost and profit efficiency estimates, let us 
move forward and analyze how efficiency estimates were influenced by regulation on 
capital requirements, controlling for other possible determinants of inefficiency 
considered in the study. 
4.2. Determinants of inefficiency 
Table 8 presents the results obtained for the country specific determinants of 
inefficiency. Besides the coefficients for the capital requirements variable and 
remaining control variables – other regulatory, macroeconomic, and market structure 
variables – for both cost and profit efficiency models, Table 8 presents also the 
correspondent t-ratio statistic. 
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Table 8 - Determinants of cost and profit inefficiency | Country specific variables 
 
Analyzing the CAPTRQR coefficients, it is possible to conclude that for our sample, the 
variable is statistically different from zero i.e., it does impact banks inefficiency 
estimates for both cost and profit models. In the cost efficiency model, the CAPTRQR 
coefficient has a negative sign, which lead us to conclude that, for our sample, it helps 
banks being more cost efficient with a confidence level of 99%. As claimed by 
Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), this negative effect on cost inefficiency finds 
support in the literature on two kinds of arguments. If higher regulatory capital 
requirements induce banks to hold more capital, then it is also expected that less 
leverage will reduce the expected bankruptcy costs (Berger, 1995; Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas, 2000; Admati et al., 2010) thus reducing the return rate demanded by debt 
holders. Second, better capitalized banks would have more retained earnings available 
to fund new investments, since they would have less to pay out in interest payments 
(Admati et al., 2010). Hence, both claims go towards the argument that regulation on 
capital requirements might reduce banks’ inefficiency.  
Regarding the profit efficiency model, the variable CAPTRQR positively affects banks’ 
efficiency, since the coefficient has also a negative sign. Therefore, an increase in the 
capital requirements for banks in our sample will increase banks profit efficiency 
estimates, with a confidence level of 90%. Beltratti and Stulz (2009) conducted an 
analysis the banking performance during the 2007-2008 crisis. The authors concluded 
that better capitalized banks performed better because equity acts as a buffer to absorb 
losses. Our analysis covers the 2007-2008 period, where profit efficiency may be 
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positively influenced by stringent capital requirements as pointed out by Beltratti and 
Stulz (2009). Overall, for the banks studied in our sample, regulatory capital 
requirements help to improve banks cost and profit efficiency. 
In what concerns the control variables, let us start analyzing the impact of the other 
three regulatory variables included in the model as determinants of inefficiency. The 
regulatory variable OFFDPWR is statistically different from zero in the cost model with 
statistical significance at the 5% level, meaning that it has negative impact on cost 
efficiency for banks in our sample. Regarding the profit efficiency side, this variable is 
statistically significant for our sample with a confidence level of 99%. The results 
indicate that OFFDPWR has a positive impact on our sample profit inefficiency, 
meaning that the greater the official disciplinary power the less profit efficient the banks 
in our sample will be. Barth et al. (2002) found evidence that the power of banks 
supervisors may be associated with higher ratios of nonperforming loans. The authors 
also found that duplication of banks oversight may tend to increase overhead costs. 
Additionally, supervision and regulation, in a context where there is a deposit insurance 
scheme, may aim to reduce excessive risk-taking by banks using mechanisms that 
probably reduce bank value (Caprio, Laeven, Levine, 2003). Also in the same line of 
thought, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) found a negative relation between prompt 
corrective power and bank development (even though the authors did not found any 
relation between official supervision and several indicators of bank performance). 
Hence, for our sample, the results also to go towards the rationale that due to the impact 
on banks’ costs and optimal risk-taking, increasing the power of disciplinary agencies 
seem to negatively impact banks’ efficiency, either from a cost perspective or from 
profit perspective. 
Regarding the variable MKTDISC, we did not find it statistically significant for cost 
inefficiencies on banks in our sample. However, the variable is statistically significant 
in the profit model with a confidence level of 99% and we found that, for our sample, 
banks which operate in economic environments with higher market discipline or private 
monitoring turn to be more profit efficient. Creating incentives to increase market 
discipline is commonly recognized by economists to “exert particularly beneficial effect 
on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions” (Barth, 
Caprio and Levine, 2004). Similar impacts of MKTDISC on profit efficiency have also 
been found by Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009). Therefore, for our sample, 
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private monitoring seems to have no impact on banks cost efficiency but it has positive 
impact on profit efficiency. 
Finally, moving to the last regulatory variable, ACTRSTR, which represents the level of 
restrictions on banks’ activities, influences negatively both cost inefficiency and profit 
inefficiency for our sample with a confidence level of 99%. Therefore, we can conclude 
that for banks in our sample, the higher the restriction on their activities the more 
efficient banks will be. Applying restrictions on banking activities is a matter of debate 
and existing literature provide mixed results (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). 
However, many arguments go towards the benefits of restricting banking activities – 
e.g. conflict of interests engaging securities underwriting and real estate investment; 
riskier behavior as the bank may invest in a more broad set of activities; formation of 
large and complex entities, difficult to manage efficiently; and large financial 
conglomerates may reduce competition and hence the efficiency of the financial sector 
(Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004). Our results seem to be aligned with such theories 
claiming that restricting banks activities may prevent banks to engage in non-traditional 
business and hurt profitability because banks may not be able to take advantage of new 
and more profitable business segments. Additionally, higher restrictions may contribute 
to banks acquire greater expertise and specialization in specific market segments 
(Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009), leading to efficiency gains as well.   
Overall, even though the positive impact of the power of the supervisory agencies on 
both cost and profit inefficiency of banks, the remaining two regulatory control 
variables - market discipline and restriction on banks’ activities - have a positive effect 
on profit efficiency estimates of banks in our sample. Restricting banks’ activities seems 
to have a positive role on cost efficiency estimates as well. It was not found statistical 
evidence that market discipline impacts cost efficiency of banks in our study. 
Moving forward to the analysis of the macroeconomic control variables, INFLATN, i.e. 
average consumer prices, is statistically significant on cost efficiency model for banks 
in our sample, whereas it has no statistically significant impact on profit efficiency 
estimates. Literature on the subject usually supports the rationale that an increase in the 
rate of inflation would make the financial sector allocate resources less efficiently, due 
to informational frictions, but also emphasizes that such impact is only binding when 
inflation exceeds certain critical rates (Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001). Grigorian and 
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Manole (2002), in a study on banking sector in transition economies, did not find 
evidence of the impact of inflation with large-scale inefficiencies, either in the form of 
price – interest rate margins – or non-price – excessive branching. Regarding changes in 
real GDP – GDPGRCP –, we find positive significant impact, at the 5% level, on cost 
inefficiency for our sample. According to Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009), 
banks may have less caution on controlling costs when they face output expansion. In 
what concerns GDPGRCP impact on profit efficiency estimates, our study did not find 
statistically significant impact for banks in our sample. 
Looking into the coefficients obtained for the financial development control variables, 
we found that domestic credit to private sector – DCPSGDP – has a negative impact on 
cost inefficiency, statistically significant at 1% level for our sample. Similar results 
were found by Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009). Conversely, the impact on 
profit inefficiency is, on average, positive for our sample, also with a confidence level 
of 99%. As the banking sector increases in size, new entrances are attracted to the 
market, increasing competition. Therefore, banks in our sample may have the incentive 
to be more cost efficient, as new entrants put additional pressure on margins and 
revenues, which in turn results in lower profit efficiency (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2000). In what concerns the size of the equity market as a percentage of GDP, 
MKTCGDP, it impacts negatively both cost and profit inefficiency for banks in our 
sample with a confidence level of 99%. This outcome is in line with Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Laeven and Levine (2004) for whom a better developed stock market may create a 
competitive environment, putting pressure on how banks operate and turning them more 
efficient. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) sustain also that as financial and stock 
markets develop, there is more available information helping banks to monitor 
borrowers leading to improved cost-efficiency. With better information on their 
potential borrowers and prospect clients, banks can also make a better fit of their 
product portfolio, potentially increasing revenues and profits. The positive impact of 
developed capital markets on banks’ soundness is also sustained by Dima, Dincă and 
Spulbăr (2014). Generally, the results obtained from our sample corroborate such 
claims.  
In what concerns the other environmental control variables, the percentage of foreign 
owned banks in an economy, identified as FOREIGN, is statistically significant at the 
1% level on both cost and profit efficiency models. The results in our sample 
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demonstrate that increasing the percentage of foreign owned banks will impact 
negatively cost inefficiency and positively on profit inefficiency. There seems to be no 
consensus in the literature on the impact of foreign owned banks on the efficiency of 
banking sector. This variable was used for control the degree of openness to 
competition on banking market, which is expected to impact profitability (Barth et al., 
2002). Barth et al. (2002) found evidence that an increase on foreign owned banks leads 
to an increase of the level of the nonperforming loans. The motive may be that as 
foreign banks enter in a new market, they try to win new clients, downgrading the 
standard credit conditions. Therefore, less profit efficiency may be expected. 
Conversely, in what concerns cost efficiency estimates, our findings seem to be 
consistent with the positive impact of foreign competition on cost efficiency as in Fries 
and Taci (2005), and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009). Grigorian and Manole 
(2002) claim that foreign owned banks may have access to better risk management and 
operational techniques leading to better cost efficiency. As already mentioned, 
competition – in this case of foreign banks – will also be an important incentive to 
banks manage costs efficiently.  
The variable percentage of government-owned banks operating in the economy, 
GOVERN, is also statistically significant in our sample for the cost efficiency model. 
We have found a negative effect on cost inefficiency of GOVERN for our sample with a 
confidence level of 99%. Our results are in line with Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis 
(2009) and are consistent with the view that state owned banks have a positive role on 
the soundness of the financial system (Stiglitz, 2004). In what concerns the impact of 
GOVERN on the profit inefficiency, the coefficient is positive, although not statistically 
significant.  
Regarding the variable CONCENT, meaning the assets of three largest commercial 
banks as a share of total commercial banking assets, it is statistically significant at the 
1% level for the cost model. Our results seem to demonstrate that, on average, the 
higher concentration level in the banking sector, the less cost efficient banks will be. 
Depending on what was the cause of an higher concentration on banking market, the 
impact on cost efficiency could go either way: if the driver for concentration was market 
power, inefficiency in costs may rise; if the objective was consolidate the market with 
the most efficient banks in the market, then the result may be an increase in cost 
efficiency (Fries and Taci, 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006). Our results seem to go 
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with the former view. Conversely, the impact of CONCENT on the profit inefficiency is 
negative with a confidence level of 99%, meaning that higher concentration of banks 
operating in an economy will lead to better profit efficiency estimates for banks in our 
sample. According to Berger and Mester (1997), banks with higher market power are 
able to charge higher prices, generating additional returns. The results obtained seem to 
support the market power theory and are somehow consistent with what we also found 
on the cost side.  
Finally, the dummy variable DEVELOP, which aims to find out if operating in a 
developed economy affects efficiency, impacts negatively both cost and profit 
inefficiency, although only on the cost model the variable is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. These results are in line with the fact that banks operating in advanced 
economies are managed in an institutional environment that induces efficiency. 
Additionally, banks also have access to higher educated labor force and to state-of-the-
art technology (Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009). 
In the inefficient component of our models, besides the country specific variables, we 
also considered bank specific control variables. The results for these determinants of 
cost and profit inefficiency are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9 - Determinants of cost and profit inefficiency | Bank specific variables 
 
From the selected variables, the ratio of equity to total assets, ETA, negatively impacts 
inefficiency for our sample on both cost and profit models. However, ETA is only 
statistically significant on the profit efficiency model at the 5% level. This result means 
that ETA ratio does not affect cost inefficiency of banks in our study, while it 
negatively impacts profit inefficiency. Such result, combined with the coefficients 
obtained for the capital requirement variable, is interesting, since bankers usually argue 
that equity is an inefficient way of funding their business (Admati et al., 2010). The 
variable cost to income, CTI, affects positively banks’ inefficiency in our sample. The 
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cost to income or efficiency ratio can, as suggested, be understood as a measure of 
efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004; Bonfim and Kim, 
2014). As such, the result is in line with what was expected: the higher the cost to 
income ratio, the less cost efficient banks in our sample are expected to be with a 99% 
confidence level. The same happens with profit efficiency: the higher the cost to income 
ratio, the less profit efficiency banks are expected to be. Regarding the variable loan 
loss reserves, LLT, the results are statistically significant at the 1% level and are 
consistent with the expected, i.e., LLT positively affects banks’ efficiency. Therefore, 
the higher the percentage of loan losses, the least efficient a bank in our sample will be. 
Concerning the variable net loans to deposits, LTD, the results suggest that it affects 
positively both cost and profit inefficiency of banks in our sample, i.e., the higher the 
ratio loan to deposits, the less efficient a bank will be. The results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. As banks have an implicit public guarantee over deposits, 
they tend to pay less for this kind of funding than the opportunity cost of funds (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1992). Therefore, as banks use other kind of funding to finance their 
loans or concede more loans than their deposits portfolio would be able to fund 
efficiently, the efficiency estimates for banks in our sample will be worse. Finally, the 
variable return on assets – ROA – negatively impacts cost and profit inefficiency but it 
is only statistically significant on cost efficiency frontier at the 10% level. For our 
sample, the higher the bank return on assets, the more cost efficient it is expected to be.  
After analyzing the statistical significance of the coefficient effects individually, it is 
also important to analyze globally how banks inefficiency in our sample is explained by 
the selected variables. According to Battese and Coelli (1995) the variance parameter, 
gamma, is a good measure of how the inefficiency effects are likely to be highly 
significant in the analysis of the stochastic frontier dependent variable. Table 10 
presents the estimated variance parameters for both cost and profit efficiency models.  
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The gamma estimates are very close to one for both models. We can conclude that the 
inefficiency effects are likely to be highly significant in the analysis of cost efficiency – 
gamma coefficient is 0.9457 –, and in the analysis of profit efficiency – gamma 
coefficient is 0.9737. 
Also important for the analysis of the efficiency frontiers globally is to test if all 
inefficiency coefficients are different from zero, i.e., the absence of inefficiency effects 
in the frontiers (𝐻0: 𝛾 = 𝛿0 = 𝛿1 = ⋯ = 𝛿17). A likelihood-ratio test (LR test) was 
used to test this hypothesis:  
𝜆 = −2{𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝐿(𝐻0)] − 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝐿(𝐻1)]} 
where the 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝐿(𝐻0)] and  𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝐿(𝐻1)] are obtained from the maximized values of the 
log-likelihood function under the null hypothesis (𝐻0) and the alternative hypothesis  
(𝐻1) respectively. The LR test statistic has a “mixed” chi-square distribution (Kodde & 
Palm, 1986; Coelli, 1996). The null hypothesis is strongly rejected at the 5% level of 
significance for the cost efficiency model and also for the profit efficiency model. LR 
tests and critical values are presented in Table 11. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
inefficiency effects exist for banks in our sample, impacting both banks’ total costs and 
banks’ profits before taxes. 
Table 11 - Empirical results for the hypothesis tests of the inefficiency effects 
 
4.3. Discussion 
“For most bankers there is an uneasy tension between making banks safer and making 
them attractive investments” (The Economist, 2013b). However, the results obtained for 
our sample seem to support the idea that capital regulation does not have to push banks 
to operate on a less efficient way. The results hold both from a cost efficiency 
perspective, and from a profit efficiency perspective. 
Notwithstanding these results, we think it is important, from a robustness perspective, to 
briefly describe how we got to this final specification and the intermediate results we 
obtained during the process. Thus, we have tried several other variables definitions and 
(10) 
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model specifications. Our first approach considered only two input prices, defined as 
financial costs and non-financial costs. This approach has been also applied by Fries 
and Taci (2005) and Kasman and Yildirim (2006) due to lack of data availability on 
employee costs and other overhead costs, which was exactly the same motive that led us 
in the same path. By doing so, we would get a significant increase on the number of 
countries studied and also on the number of bank-year observations. However, with 
such variables specification, we were not able to obtain estimates for the inefficiency 
parameters of the cost efficiency model. Since we were trying to get a comprehensive 
view on the impact of capital regulation on bank efficiency, studying both cost and 
profit perspectives was necessary. Therefore, several adjustments to the variable 
definitions were made in the process, while trying to keep as many observations as we 
could. One of the approaches followed was normalization of bank specific variables by 
the country mean value. An alternative approach also followed was to put a cap and a 
floor on variables values. In this sense, no variable could be less than the percentile 10
th
 
or larger than the percentile 90
th
. We have also tried to normalize bank specific 
variables for each bank’s total assets. All these approaches did not generate results for 
the cost efficiency model. However, for the profit efficiency frontier, the results for the 
different samples studied – the number of bank-year observations were changing 
according to data availability to construct the variables – seemed to converge in a 
similar finding: regulation on capital requirements negatively affects profit inefficiency, 
although the estimates were not always statistically significant for the commonly 
applied confidence levels. However, and we believe that is a relevant result, capital 
requirements never positively impact profit inefficiency. 
Different approaches have also been followed in the sample selection criteria. One of 
the approaches followed was selecting banks that belong to the same country. The 
selected country was the USA because it was the country with more bank-year 
observations. A different sample selection method that was also tested was to construct 
a balanced panel dataset, i.e., to consider banks for which there was available data for 
the full nine years of the study. Again, no results were obtained for the cost efficiency 
frontier. Regarding the impact of capital regulation on profit efficiency, no statistically 
evidence was found that it would positively affect inefficiency. 
Thus, the methodology followed in the study is highly impacted by variable definition. 
Only by specifying three input prices – borrowed funds, physical capital and labor – it 
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was possible to generate results for both cost and profit efficiency frontiers. But this 
approach came with a cost: to sacrifice between three and six thousand bank-year 
observations, depending on with which specifications we are comparing. However, all 
the results obtained until then were consistent with the claim that regulation on capital 
requirements does not affect negatively banking efficiency. 
In defining the variable cost of borrowed funds (P1), the approach usually followed is to 
compute a ratio between interest expenses and deposits. However, besides deposits, 
banks hold other interest-bearing financial obligations that need to be accounted for if 
we intend to have an accurate proxy for the variable cost of borrowed funds. Hence, 
besides deposits and short-term borrowing, also long-term debt was included as 
denominator in the variable computation. This new specifications led to the final 
version of the results presented in the study and, as we aforementioned, goes towards 
the argument that capital requirements regulation does not negatively impact bank 
efficiency. 
Regarding the control variables considered in our study, the impact of the remaining 
three regulatory variables on our sample efficiency estimates did not keep the same 
level of robustness when the variable definition changed. Macroeconomic variables 
were also subject to volatility in results depending on how variables were defined. 
Financial development variables’ positive impact on cost efficiency seems to hold 
despite variables definition. The same does not happen on profit efficiency. On the other 
environmental variables, consistency seems also to hold for the cost efficiency model. 
On profit efficiency, we also find some volatility in the results. Finally, the bank 
specific variables seem to hold consistency across different specifications, with the 
variables loan to deposits, loan loss reserve to gross loans, and cost to income positively 
impacting banks inefficiency in our sample. The variables return on assets and equity to 
total assets negatively impact profit inefficiency whatever the cost of borrowed funds 
specification is applied. 
Therefore, despite the robustness of our results regarding the impact of capital 
regulation on banks’ efficiency – even though not always statistically significant until a 
broad liabilities definition was applied –, the methodology followed seems to be very 
sensitive to variables definition. Our final results were based on variables definitions 
supported in the literature (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Maudos et al., 2002; 
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Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis, 2009) but came at the cost of losing a large number 
of bank-year observations.  Hence, due to the relevance of the matter on public policy, 
the on-going debate on banking regulation and, consequently, the impact of any 
decision-making on the economy as a whole, we think it might be useful to continue the 
research on this topic, mainly in gathering a more comprehensive dataset which would 
allow a more representative and robust analysis on the matter. 
4.4 Capital regulation: does it impact banks’ efficiency (revisited)? 
In the literature review, we have discussed several theoretical arguments for and against 
setting higher capital requirements on banking industry. But no matter the line of 
though one defends, it is when bad times come that the strength of banks capital 
structure is placed into test. The problem with social sciences is that some theories and 
models are only tested empirically when the happenings we wish to analyze occur. 
Hence, being able to analyze how regulation on capital requirements impacted banks’ 
efficiency during the time horizon that sparked one of the biggest financial crisis ever is 
probably one of the major gains of this thesis for empirical knowledge on this subject. 
Although the continuous reference to the impact of increasing capital requirements on 
banks profitability (The Economist, 2014c), ours results suggest that capital 
requirements negatively impacts on banks inefficiency for the time window 2004-2012. 
However, if we analyze the efficiency estimates between 2004 and 2012, there is a clear 
drop – especially on profit efficiency estimates – on 2008, which is the year of Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy. Cost efficiency estimates continued to drop one year further after 
bounce back. But both cost and profit efficiencies estimates did not continue the same 
improving trend that, on average, banks in our sample were following between 2004 
and 2007. Such findings raised questions regarding the consistency of the coefficients 
obtained if we split the overall time frame into two periods. Considering the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy year as the relevant date for the splitting, two sub-samples were 
created: one with bank-year observations between 2004 and 2007; and a second sub-
sample with bank-year observations for the time frame 2008-2012
2
. Table 12 presents 
the results for the determinants of inefficiency in the sample with bank-year 
observations 2004-2007. 
                                                 
2
 A third sub-sample containing only bank-year observations between 2009 and 2012 (i.e., excluding 
2008 as it was the relevant year for the split) was analyzed. The results on capital requirements 
coefficients are consistent with what was obtained when we include 2008 in the second sub-sample.   
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Table 12 - Determinants of cost and profit inefficiency | Bank-year observations 2004-2007 
 
On the cost efficiency model, the variable capital requirements – CAPTRQR – impacts 
negatively banks inefficiency for the sub-sample 2004-2007. This result is consistent 
with the coefficient obtained for the complete sample. The impacts of the remaining 
three regulatory control variables on cost inefficiency for the sub-sample 2004-2007 are 
also consistent with what we have found for the 2004-2012 time window. But on the 
profit efficiency model, the capital requirement coefficient is, for the sub-sample 2004-
2007, positive, even though not statistically significant. No changes on the impact of the 
remaining regulatory variables were found.  
Let us now get an overview on the results obtained on the sub-sample 2008-2012 (Table 
13). 
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Table 13 - Determinants of cost and profit inefficiency | Bank-year observations 2008-2012 
 
The impacts on banking inefficiency of regulatory capital requirements are statistically 
significant and negative on both cost and profit models. This is consistent with the 
overall results when we use 2004-2012 bank-year observations. The variable 
OFFDPWR – measure of the power of supervision – has a negative impact on banks 
inefficiency for this sub-sample, while market discipline index – MKTDISC – is 
statistically significant and has a positive impact on cost inefficiency. On the cost 
model, the impact of these two variables has changed when comparing this sub-sample 
with the full sample. On the profit efficiency side, the results are aligned with what was 
obtained for the full sample – even though OFFDPW is no longer statistically 
significant. Hence, overall, the impact of capital requirements on cost efficiency 
frontiers in the two sub-samples seems to be consistent with what was found using data 
from the 9 years’ time-horizon. Regarding the profit efficiency model, capital 
requirements is also statistically significant for the sub-period 2008-2012 and negatively 
affects profit inefficiency. However, for the period before 2008, the capital regulation 
coefficient positively impacts profit inefficiency, even though not being statistically 
significant. From a public policy perspective, this finding is particularly relevant 
because it seems that in the years in which banks faced stressful conditions, capital 
requirements start to positively impact banks’ profit efficiency. That is exactly the 
reason why capital is important: to absorb losses when banks incur on them without 
interfering with banks’ role as financial intermediaries (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 
1995). And, as our results demonstrate, it seems that capital requirements importance 
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for banks’ efficiency is highlighted during stressful economic conditions, something 
that is in line Admati et al. (2010) claim that “capital regulation can be a powerful tool 
for enhancing the role of banks in the economy”. 
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Chapter 5 | Conclusion 
The impact of imposing minimum capital requirements on banks is a controversial 
subject, with the industry arguing that there is a tradeoff between the equity level a bank 
must have and the industry profitability. However, this rule of thumb has been 
challenged theoretically (Admati et al., 2010) and empirically. For instance, after 
Sweden’s 1990 banking crisis, the country took the lead on regulation, imposing some 
of the highest capital ratios in the rich world (The Economist, 2013b). Despite that, 
“Swedish banks are generating the highest returns on equity among rich-world banks” 
(The Economist, 2013b). Several reasons are pointed out for this outcome and comprise 
cost control, market structure, and solidity of their balance-sheets due to… high capital 
ratios. 
To study banks’ activities, instead of using traditional measures of performance (e.g. 
return on equity), our approach applied efficiency measures which, according to Berger 
and Humphrey (1997), are “particularly valuable in assessing and informing 
government policy regarding financial institutions”. Therefore, this study evaluated how 
regulation on capital requirements impacts cost and profit efficiency of banks. It 
allowed an international comparison on banking regulation, capturing changes on public 
policies towards banks over time and encompassed one of the major financial crisis 
since 1929. It used a panel dataset of 865 observations from 156 publicly listed 
commercial banks operating in 30 countries and covering a nine year time-horizon 
(2004-2012). For doing so, as Berger and Humphrey (1992), Berger and Mester (1997), 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Maudos et al. (2002), and Pasiouras, Tanna and 
Zopounidis (2009), we have followed a structural approach to explain banks’ 
performance. We modelled a cost efficiency frontier and an alternative profit efficiency 
frontier. Cost efficiency analysis has been an important potential source of cost 
reduction (Maudos et al., 2002). However, minimizing costs is not a sufficient condition 
to achieve profit efficiency. Hence, it was modelled an alternative profit frontier to 
evaluate the impact of capital regulation on this dimension as well.  Maudos et al. 
(2002) and Kasman and Yildirim (2006) pointed out that the alternative profit efficiency 
is more appropriate when international comparisons are being made, which has been 
also the case.  
The impact of regulatory capital requirements on banking efficiency was assessed using 
the Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic frontier production function for panel data to 
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estimate inefficiency effects. Besides the impact on capital regulation, we also 
controlled for the influence of other regulatory variables, macroeconomic conditions, 
market structure characteristics and the state of financial development. 
Our results indicate that, on average, banks demonstrate to be more cost efficient than 
profit efficient. Also consistent with the literature, – e.g. Berger and Mester (1997); 
Guevara and Maudos (2002); and Pasiouras, Tanna and Zopounidis (2009) –, our results 
suggest that the most efficient banks on the cost side are not necessarily the most profit 
efficient. These results go towards the idea “that the analysis of cost efficiency offers 
only a partial view of the efficiency of a banking firm and consequently the need to 
analyze also inefficiencies in profits” (Guevara and Maudos, 2002). 
Regarding the impact of regulation on capital requirements over banks’ efficiency, we 
concluded that it negatively affects inefficiency, meaning that, for our sample, an 
increase on regulatory equity ratios will lead to efficiency improvement. Those findings 
are in the spirit of Berger (1995), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Beltratti and Stulz 
(2009), and Mehran and Thakor (2011). We have also assessed if there was any change 
on the impact of capital requirements on banks’ efficiency before and after the peak of 
the financial crisis, dividing the sample in two sub-periods: 2004-2007; and 2008-2012. 
In what concerns cost efficiency, the impacts of capital requirements are consistent for 
all the analyzed periods, i.e., it negatively impacts cost inefficiency. However, the same 
does not happen with profit efficiency model. In the period 2004-2007, the capital 
regulation coefficient positively impacts profit inefficiency, even though not being 
statistically significant. From a public policy perspective, which should care about 
systemic risk, this finding is particularly relevant because as banks faced a worsening of 
the surrounding conditions, it seems that capital requirements started to positively 
impact banks profit efficiency. Similar findings were found by Beltratti and Stulz 
(2009) and are in line with capital relevance as a loss absorber and as a tool of 
preventing financial distress (Berger, Herring and Szegö, 1995). 
Although our main focus is the impact of capital requirements on banks’ efficiency, let 
us also summarize what can be concluded for the remaining regulatory control variables 
due to its relevancy for public policies. The power of disciplinary agencies seems to 
negatively impact banks’ efficiency, either from a cost perspective or from profit 
perspective. However, on the cost frontier for the sub-sample 2008-2012, the reverse 
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seems to be true as well. So, in stressful conditions, it may help banks being more cost 
efficient. Regarding market discipline, we concluded that banks which operate in 
economic environments with higher market discipline or private monitoring turn to be 
more profit efficient. This conclusion also holds if we analyze the dataset separately, 
i.e., 2004-2007 and 2008-2012. Finally, the level of restrictions on banks’ activities 
negatively impacts inefficiency. Hence, from a public policy perspective, we would say 
that regulation should aim to increase market discipline, while restricting banks 
activities. This could result in safer banks, and not necessarily less efficiency in 
providing financial services. 
In bank specific determinants of inefficiency, the variable equity to total assets 
negatively impacts either profit inefficiency or cost efficiency (although not statistically 
significant in the later). Such result, combined with the result obtained for the regulatory 
capital requirements variable, may be interesting in a context where bankers usually 
argue that equity is an inefficient way of funding their business. Conversely, our results 
seem to support Admati et al. (2010), for whom “capital regulation can be a powerful 
tool for enhancing the role of banks in the economy”. 
As the new regulatory framework that will be applied to banks is still an ongoing 
process, this thesis addresses “the vexed question of the level of capital banks should 
hold to guard against future losses” (The Economist, 2014d). Our findings go towards 
those who sustain that setting higher capital requirements will not only contribute for 
banks’ resilience, but also to increase banks’ efficiency as well (Admati et al., 2010; 
Eavis, 2013). Other regulatory tools may also contribute to the system stability, without 
harming banks’ efficiency. Such results are extremely relevant from a public policy 
perspective, as it may help to design a better regulatory framework. Despite these 
results, a more comprehensive study, gathering a broader dataset will definitely be an 
important step forward to support the decision-making process among banking industry 
stakeholders. Not least, it would also be important to deepen the knowledge on what 
does truly impact banks’ efficiency, looking at other dimensions, such as corporate 
governance (Laeven and Levine, 2009), cost control, or market structure. As 
externalities for the economy of the last financial crisis are not over yet, this is the time 
to understand how the probability of such events can be reduced in the future. Setting 
higher minimum capital requirements has been one of the main solutions put forth to 
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Appendices 
Appendix I – Information on regulatory variables 
Variable Category Description (BRSS 2007) Description (BRSS 2011) 
    
CAPTRQR Capital 
requirements 
This variable is calculated adding 1 if 
the answer is yes to the questions 1-4 
and 0 otherwise. Conversely, 1 will be 
added if answer to questions 5 and 6 is 
no (and 0 otherwise). 1) Is this ratio 
risk weighted in line with the 1988 
Basle guidelines? 2) Does the 
minimum ratio vary as a function of 
market risk? 3) Before minimum 
capital adequacy is determined, which 
of the following are deducted from the 
book value of capital: A. Market value 
of loan losses not realized in 
accounting books? B. Unrealized losses 
in securities portfolios? C. Unrealized 
foreign exchange losses? If any answer 
to 3.A, 3.B, or 3.C is yes, then the 
answer to 3 will be considered as yes 
and 1 point will be added. 4) Are the 
sources of funds to be used as capital 
verified by the regulatory/supervisory 
authorities? 5) Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent injections 
of capital be done with assets other 
than cash or government securities? 6) 
Can initial disbursement of capital be 
done with borrowed funds? 
This variable is calculated adding 1 if 
the answer is yes to the questions 1-4 
and 0 otherwise. Conversely, 1 will be 
added if answer to questions 5 and 6 is 
no (and 0 otherwise). 1) Which 
regulatory capital adequacy regimes 
did you use as of end of 2010: A. Basel 
I? B. Basel II? If 1.A or 2.B is 
answered with yes, then the answer to 
1 will be considered as yes and 1 point 
will be added. 2) Which risks are 
covered by the current regulatory 
minimum capital requirements in your 
jurisdiction: market risk? 3) Are the 
following items deducted from 
regulatory capital: unrealized losses in 
fair valued exposures? 4) Are the 
sources of funds to be used as capital 
verified by the regulatory/supervisory 
authorities? 5) Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent injections 
of capital be done with assets other 
than cash or government securities? 6) 
Can initial capital contributions by 
prospective shareholders be in the form 
of borrowed funds? 
OFFDPWR Power of the 
supervisory 
authorities 
This variable is obtained adding 1 if the 
answer is yes to the following 12 
questions (and 0 otherwise). 1) Does 
the supervisory agency have the right 
to meet with external auditors to 
discuss their report without the 
approval of the bank? 2) Are auditors 
required by law to communicate 
directly to the supervisory agency any 
This variable is obtained adding 1 if the 
answer is yes to the following 12 
questions (and 0 otherwise). 1) Does 
the banking supervisor have the right to 
meet with the external auditors and 
discuss their report without the 
approval of the bank? A. No; B. Yes, it 
happens on a regular basis; C. Yes, it 
happens on an exceptional basis. One 
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presumed involvement of bank 
directors or senior managers in illicit 
activities, fraud, or insider abuse? 3) 
Can supervisors take legal action 
against external auditors for 
negligence? 4) Can the supervisory 
authority force a bank to change its 
internal organizational structure? 5) 
Are off-balance sheet items disclosed 
to supervisors? 6) Can the supervisory 
agency order the bank's directors or 
management to constitute provisions to 
cover actual or potential losses? 7) Can 
the supervisory agency suspend the 
directors' decision to distribute: A. 
Dividends? B. Bonuses? If 7.A or 7.B 
is answered with yes, then the answer 
to 7 will be considered as yes and 1 
point will be added. 8) Can the 
supervisory agency suspend the 
directors' decision to distribute 
management fees? 9) Who can legally 
declare that a bank is insolvent: bank 
supervisor? 10) Regarding bank 
restructuring and reorganization, can 
the supervisory agency supersede 
shareholder rights? 11) Regarding bank 
restructuring and reorganization, can 
the supervisory agency remove and 
replace management? 12) Regarding 
bank restructuring and reorganization, 
can the supervisory agency remove and 
replace directors? 
point was added either to answer B or 
C. 2) Are auditors required to 
communicate directly to the 
supervisory agency any presumed 
involvement of bank directors or senior 
managers in illicit activities, fraud, or 
insider abuse? 3) In cases where the 
supervisor identifies that the bank has 
received an inadequate audit, does the 
supervisor have the powers to take 
actions against the external auditor? 4) 
Can the supervisory authority force a 
bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? 5) Do banks 
disclose to the supervisors off-balance 
sheet items? 6) Please indicate whether 
the following enforcement powers are 
available to the supervisory agency: 
require banks to constitute provisions 
to cover actual or potential losses? 7) 
Please indicate whether the following 
enforcement powers are available to 
the supervisory agency: require banks 
to reduce or suspend dividends to 
shareholders? 8) Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the supervisory 
agency: require banks to reduce or 
suspend bonuses and other 
remuneration to bank directors and 
managers? 9) Does bank supervisor has 
the powers to declare insolvency? 10) 
Does bank supervisor has the powers to 
supersede shareholders' rights? 11) 
Please indicate whether the following 
enforcement powers are available to 
the supervisory agency: suspend or 
remove managers? 12) Please indicate 
whether the following enforcement 
powers are available to the supervisory 
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This variable is determined adding 1 if 
the answer is yes to the questions 1-6 
and 0 otherwise. Conversely, 1 will be 
added if answer to questions 7 and 8 is 
no (and 0 otherwise). 1) Is 
subordinated debt allowable as part of 
regulatory capital? 2) Are financial 
institutions required to produce 
consolidated accounts covering all 
bank and any non-bank financial 
subsidiaries (including affiliates of 
common holding companies)? 3) Are 
off-balance sheet items disclosed to the 
public? 4) Must banks disclose their 
risk management procedures to the 
public? 5) Are bank directors legally 
liable if information disclosed is 
erroneous or misleading? 6) Do 
regulations require credit ratings for 
commercial banks? 7) Does accrued, 
though unpaid, interest/principal enter 
the income statement while the loan is 
still non-performing? 8) Is there an 
explicit deposit insurance protection 
system? 
This variable is determined adding 1 if 
the answer is yes to the questions 1-6 
and 0 otherwise. Conversely, 1 will be 
added if answer to questions 7 and 8 is 
no (and 0 otherwise). 1) Is 
subordinated debt allowable as part of 
regulatory capital: A. Tier 1 capital? B. 
Tier 2? If 1.A or 2.B is answered with 
yes, then the answer to 1 will be 
considered as yes and 1 point will be 
added. 2)  Are banks required to 
prepare consolidated accounts for 
accounting purposes? 3) Do banks 
disclose to the public off-balance sheet 
items? 4) Do banks disclose to the 
public governance and risk 
management framework? 5) Are bank 
directors legally liable if information 
disclosed is erroneous or misleading? 
6) Are commercial banks required by 
supervisors to have external credit 
ratings? 7) Does accrued, though 
unpaid, interest/principal enter the 
bank's income statement while the loan 
is classified as non-performing? 8) Is 
there an explicit deposit insurance 





This variable is obtained as the average 
of the restrictions level on banking 
activities. To each of the four activities 
will be assigned a value between 1-4 
which means the activity is unrestricted 
(1), permitted (2), restricted (3) or 
prohibited (4). The activities are: 1) 
Securities activities? 2) Insurance 
activities? 3) Real estate activities? 4) 
Can banks own voting shares in 
This variable is obtained as the average 
of the restrictions level on banking 
activities. To each of the four activities 
will be assigned a value between 1-4 
which means the activity is unrestricted 
(1), permitted (2), restricted (3) or 
prohibited (4). The activities are: 1) 
Securities activities? 2) Insurance 
activities? 3) Real estate activities? 4) 
Can banks own voting shares in 
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nonfinancial firms? nonfinancial firms? 
 
Appendix II – Information on bank specific variables 
Variable Description Bloomberg inputs Calculation rule 
    




Total Loans (BS020) 
Earning Assets (RR141) 





Short-Term Borrowing and Secs Sold 
Under Repo (F0636) 
Q3 = Deposits (BS041) + Short-Term 
Borrowing and Secs Sold Under Repo 
(F0636) 
P1 Cost of 
borrowed 
funds 
Interest Expense (IS022) 
Deposits (BS041) 
Short-Term Borrowing and Secs Sold 
Under Repo (F0636) 
LT Debt (BS051) 
P1 = Interest Expense (IS022) / 
[Deposits (BS041) + Short-Term 
Borrowing and Secs Sold Under Repo 
(F0636) + LT Debt (BS051)] 
P2 Cost of 
physical 
capital 
General and Administrative Expenses 
(A0181) 
Net fixed assets (BS032) 
P2 = General and Administrative 
Expenses (A0181) / Net fixed assets 
(BS032) 
P3 Cost of labor Salaries and Employee Benefits 
(A0633) 
Salaries Wages and Employee Benefits 
(A0008) 
Total Assets (BS035) 
P3 = OR(Salaries and Employee 
Benefits (A0633); Salaries Wages and 
Employee Benefits (A0008)) / Total 
Assets (BS035) 
E Total equity Total Equity (RR007) E = Total Equity (RR007) + 
[abs(min(Total Equity (RR007)))+1] 
A Total assets Total Assets (BS035) A = Total Assets (BS035) 
TC Total cost Interest Expense (IS022) 
Non-interest exp (RR494) 
TC = Interest Expense (IS022) + Non-
interest exp (RR494) 
PBT Profit before 
taxes 
Pretax income (RR001) PBT = Pretax income 
(RR001)+[abs(min(Pretax income 
(RR001)))+1] 
ROA Return on 
assets 
Return on Assets (RR028) ROA = Return on Assets (RR028) 
LTD Net loans to 
deposits 
Net loans (BS022) 
Deposits (BS041) 
Short-Term Borrowing and Secs Sold 
Under Repo (F0636) 
LTD = Net loans (BS022) / [Deposits 
(BS041) + Short-Term Borrowing and 
Secs Sold Under Repo (F0636)] x 100 
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LLT Loan loss to 
total loans 
Total Loans (BS020) 
Res doubtful debt (BS021) 
LLT = Res doubtful debt (BS021) / 
Total Loans (BS020) x 100 
ETA Equity to 
total assets 
Total Equity (RR007) 
Total Assets (BS035) 
ETA = Total Equity (RR007) / Total 
Assets (BS035) x 100 
CTI Cost to 
income 
Efficiency Ratio (RR143) CTI = Efficiency Ratio (RR143) 
 
Appendix III – IMF Country classification and geographical region 
Country Advanced/ Developing economy Geographical region 
   
Argentina Developing economy Latin America & Caribbean 
Belgium Advanced economy Euro Area 
Botswana Developing economy Middle East and Africa 
Brazil Developing economy Latin America & Caribbean 
Chile Developing economy Latin America & Caribbean 
Colombia Developing economy Latin America & Caribbean 
Croatia Developing economy Central and East Europe 
Cyprus Advanced economy Euro Area 
Denmark Advanced economy Other Advc 
Finland Advanced economy Euro Area 
France Advanced economy Euro Area 
Germany Advanced economy Euro Area 
Ghana Developing economy Middle East and Africa 
Greece Advanced economy Euro Area 
Indonesia Developing economy Devel Asia 
Kazakhstan Developing economy Central and East Europe 
Kenya Developing economy Middle East and Africa 
Mexico Developing economy Latin America & Caribbean 
Morocco Developing economy Middle East and Africa 
Netherlands Advanced economy Euro Area 
Nigeria Developing economy Middle East and Africa 
Pakistan Developing economy Middle East and Africa 
Peru Developing economy Latin America & Caribbean 
Poland Developing economy Central and East Europe 
Portugal Advanced economy Euro Area 
Russia Developing economy Central and East Europe 
Spain Advanced economy Euro Area 
Switzerland Advanced economy Other Advc 
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United Kingdom Advanced economy Other Advc 
United States Advanced economy Other Advc 
 
Appendix IV – Cost and profit efficiency estimates: mean by country 
Country N Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
    
Argentina 48 0.9113 0.7808 
Belgium 13 0.9461 0.7810 
Botswana 5 0.9083 0.8468 
Brazil 112 0.8677 0.5015 
Chile 46 0.9380 0.8033 
Colombia 9 0.8182 0.7156 
Croatia 2 0.8546 0.8888 
Cyprus 3 0.9802 0.8373 
Denmark 1 0.9753 0.9246 
Finland 2 0.8685 0.9495 
France 17 0.9428 0.8873 
Germany 12 0.8555 0.7168 
Ghana 1 0.9250 0.8212 
Greece 45 0.9438 0.8037 
Indonesia 209 0.9503 0.7423 
Kazakhstan 4 0.9255 0.7753 
Kenya 8 0.8683 0.8072 
Mexico 2 0.6981 0.9228 
Morocco 4 0.7468 0.8461 
Netherlands 8 0.9709 0.7428 
Nigeria 6 0.7946 0.8963 
Pakistan 112 0.9333 0.8521 
Peru 9 0.7947 0.8162 
Poland 12 0.9085 0.8108 
Portugal 43 0.9416 0.7151 
Russia 8 0.9522 0.8314 
Spain 51 0.9449 0.8741 
Switzerland 42 0.9624 0.9285 
United Kingdom 29 0.9730 0.7833 
United States 2 0.9647 0.2785 
Total / Average 865 0.9260 0.7598 
Notes: 
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Cost efficiency: 1/Cost eff. est. (0-1); Profit efficiency: Technical eff. est. (0-1); Values 
closer to 1 meaning a higher level of efficiency; Efficiency estimates were obtained 
from the program FRONTIER (Version 4.1c). Sample means have been calculated 
using bank-year observations (865) and not country observations (30). 
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